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1579 
Article 
The Geography of Equal Protection 
Christopher R. Leslie† 
Equal protection doctrine should play a central role in the 
evolution of gay rights jurisprudence. After all, gay Americans 
simply want to be afforded legal rights equal to those of their 
heterosexual family members, coworkers, and neighbors. His-
torically, however, most equal protection claims challenging an-
ti-gay laws have failed. Most of these failures flowed from 
courts’ refusal to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. By evaluating anti-gay laws under the 
more deferential rational basis standard, judges generally up-
hold laws with the purpose and effect of denying equality to 
millions of Americans. 
Many judges who refuse to treat sexual orientation as a 
suspect classification justify their holdings by asserting that 
gay men and lesbians are not politically powerless and, thus, 
are not entitled to heightened scrutiny. It is puzzling that judg-
es claim that gay men and lesbians have so much political pow-
er given that the federal government, dozens of state govern-
ments, and hundreds of local governments have enacted laws to 
discriminate against gay people. 
Several scholars have criticized courts for applying the po-
litical powerlessness factor of equal protection analysis incon-
sistently and without a proper measurement tool. This Article 
adds another critique: courts generally fail to consider the ge-
ography of political power. Minorities can have political power 
in some locations but not others. Judicial conclusions regarding 
political power are based primarily on where judges look for ev-
idence. This Article demonstrates how courts misapply the po-
 
†  Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of 
Law. The author thanks Erwin Chemerinsky, Catherine Fisk, Doug NeJaime, 
Tony Reese, and Bertrall Ross for comments on earlier drafts, and the partici-
pants in the UC Irvine School of Law workshop for early feedback on the pro-
ject. Copyright © 2017 by Christopher R. Leslie. 
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litical power component of equal protection analysis when de-
termining whether a classification is suspect. This is most easi-
ly observed in the judicial treatment of sexual orientation. 
Using the decades-old debate over whether laws that dis-
criminate based on sexual orientation should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny, this Article shows how courts generally 
have mishandled the geographic dimension of the political 
power inquiry. Using sexual orientation as a case study to ex-
plore the geography of political power is appropriate, given the 
legal vulnerability of the millions of gay and lesbian Americans 
targeted by anti-gay laws.1 For well over half a century, gay 
Americans have existed as an “unrecognized minority” relegat-
ed to second-class citizenship—if recognized as citizens at all.2 
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the basics of equal pro-
tection analysis. Courts are split on whether to apply height-
ened scrutiny or rational basis review to laws and policies that 
discriminate based on sexual orientation. The level of scrutiny 
applied in equal protection analysis is particularly important in 
gay rights litigation. Courts tend to uphold anti-gay laws when 
applying rational basis review, but almost always invalidate 
anti-gay laws when heightened scrutiny is employed. Thus, be-
cause the level of scrutiny is often outcome determinative, the 
probability of courts protecting gay Americans from discrimina-
tion is often a function of whether judges conclude that sexual 
orientation is a suspect classification. To determine this, courts 
generally consider four factors: whether the members of the 
group: (1) have historically been subjected to discrimination; (2) 
share a defining characteristic unrelated to their ability to per-
form or contribute to society; (3) share a defining immutable 
characteristic; and (4) lack political power. Courts almost uni-
formly find that the first two factors describe gay people. While 
courts have split on the third factor, the modern trend is to 
 
 1. See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Ra-
tionales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 
WASHBURN L.J. 33, 53 (2010) (“[W]hether to recognize sexual orientation as a 
suspect classification is the critical issue for the Court’s suspect classification 
jurisprudence.”).  
 2. DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJEC-
TIVE APPROACH 13 (1951) (“Thus the homosexuals constitute what can be 
termed the unrecognized minority. We are a group by reason of the fact that 
we have impulses in common that separate us from the larger mass of people 
we are a minority, not only numerically, but also as a result of a caste-like sta-
tus in society.”); see also In re Longstaff, 538 F. Supp. 589, 593 (N.D. Tex. 
1982), aff ’d In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1451 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying citi-
zenship to petitioner because of his homosexuality). 
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treat sexual orientation as immutable. This makes the fourth 
factor—political powerlessness—critical in determining wheth-
er sexual orientation is a suspect classification. 
Part II focuses on the political power component of equal 
protection analysis. The purpose of the political power factor is 
to ensure legal protections for minorities who face discrimina-
tion because of a failed political process. Although many courts 
have held this factor to be determinative in denying heightened 
scrutiny of anti-gay laws, courts have not clearly defined politi-
cal power for the purposes of suspect classifications. Part II re-
views the well-recognized problems with the political power in-
quiry. First, and foremost, courts have not constructed an 
actual measure of political power. Second, courts apply the po-
litical power factor inconsistently by treating gays as too politi-
cally powerful to warrant heightened scrutiny, while simulta-
neously granting heightened scrutiny to many groups—
including straight, white men—who have considerably more po-
litical power than gays. Ultimately, courts often apply the polit-
ical power factor in a manner that is impossible to satisfy be-
cause judges ignore truly powerless groups. 
Part III introduces a new critique of political power analy-
sis in equal protection jurisprudence based on the geography of 
political power. Gay Americans face discrimination from every 
level of government. The federal government has long discrimi-
nated against gay people—from prohibiting their immigration 
and governmental employment for most of the twentieth centu-
ry to, more recently, forbidding the recognition of legal same-
sex marriages. In the absence of federal-level protections, gay 
Americans are also subject to discriminatory laws imposed by 
their state governments. Before 1960, all states criminalized 
private sexual conduct between consenting adult same-sex cou-
ples through sodomy laws, laws that remained in place in a 
dozen states until invalidated by the Supreme Court in Law-
rence v. Texas.3 Until 2003, all states banned same-sex mar-
riage. Although the Supreme Court struck down sodomy laws 
and same-sex marriage bans as violating the U.S. Constitu-
tion,4 many state governments continue to enact and enforce 
explicitly anti-gay laws, including prohibiting gay individuals 
and couples from adopting children, legally authorizing anti-
gay discrimination by both government officials and private in-
 
 3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 4. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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dividuals who operate public accommodations, and forbidding 
cities from including sexual orientation in their local nondis-
crimination ordinances. In contrast to these relatively gay-
hostile states, some states have enacted gay-protective laws, 
such as including sexual orientation in non-discrimination laws 
covering employment and public accommodations. 
Part IV discusses how courts fail to appreciate these re-
gional variations in political power when determining whether 
gays have political power. In many cases, courts have relied 
upon evidence of political power in geographic areas that are 
irrelevant to the actual political process that produced the anti-
gay law being challenged. For example, in equal protection 
challenges to federal laws and policies—such as the military’s 
prohibition on gay servicemembers—many courts have held 
that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification because a 
handful of states and several cities have adopted gay-inclusive 
nondiscrimination laws. These courts have never explained 
why these isolated non-federal victories are relevant to whether 
gays have political power to affect federal anti-gay laws, such 
as those being challenged in a particular case. Similarly, when 
evaluating equal protection challenges to anti-gay state laws, 
courts often find that gays have political power—and thus do 
not qualify for heightened scrutiny—by pointing to gay-
protective laws in other states. This makes little sense. The fact 
that the California legislature does a relatively good job of pro-
tecting gay rights should not mean that anti-gay legislation in 
Oklahoma gets substantial judicial deference. To do so would 
essentially punish gay citizens in Oklahoma for the political 
victories achieved by gay citizens in California. Part IV ex-
plains that courts make a fundamental error when they exam-
ine the wrong geographic area when discussing the political 
power factor. 
Finally, Part V considers the legal implications of these ge-
ographic issues for equal protection analysis. The most 
straightforward solution to the problem of regional variations 
in political power would be for courts to consider whether gay 
people have meaningful political power with respect to the spe-
cific legislative body that enacted the anti-gay law that is being 
challenged. While this could solve the problems highlighted in 
Part IV, it would create larger problems of asymmetrical con-
stitutional protections, as the same law could fail heightened 
scrutiny in some states (where gays are determined to be politi-
cally powerless) and yet survive rational basis in other states 
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(where gays are determined to be politically powerful). Part V 
explains that given the regional variations of political power, 
coupled with the need for uniform application of equal protec-
tion analysis across the nation, the most prudent approach is to 
eliminate the political power inquiry altogether and instead re-
ly on other factors that better indicate whether a challenged 
law is likely a product of prejudice. The factors of historical dis-
crimination and whether the members of the affected group 
share a defining characteristic related to their ability to per-
form or contribute to society are better geared for this purpose. 
I.  EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE   
A.  THE MECHANICS OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Equal Protection Clause protects members of disad-
vantaged groups from discriminatory laws and policies imposed 
by political majorities.5 Scholars have advanced competing the-
ories to explain the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. For 
example, under anti-subordination theory, “the Equal Protec-
tion Clause should be understood to bar those government ac-
tions that have the intent or the effect of perpetuating tradi-
tional patterns of hierarchy.”6 In contrast, anti-classification 
theory argues that “the government may not classify people ei-
ther overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden cate-
gory.”7 
Whatever the theoretical underpinnings, equal protection 
analysis proceeds in three steps.8 In the first step, the judge de-
termines whether the challenged law classifies people based on 
a particular trait. In the second step, the court determines the 
level of scrutiny associated with that classification. Finally, in 
 
 5. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on 
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1161, 1174 (1988) (“The function of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect 
disadvantaged groups . . . against the effects of past and present discrimina-
tion by political majorities.”). 
 6. Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Toward a Zero-
Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206 (2010). 
 7. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradi-
tion: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 
(2003); see also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future 
Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1064 n.16 (2011) (describ-
ing the two competing theories). 
 8. See, e.g., Kan. One-Call Sys., Inc. v. State, 274 P.3d 625, 635 (Kan. 
2012) (listing the three steps in explaining equal protection analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution’s Bill of Rights). 
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the third step, the court applies the appropriate level of scruti-
ny—arrived at in step two—and determines whether the chal-
lenged law violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Regarding the second step, the Supreme Court has deline-
ated three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scru-
tiny, and rational basis review.9 These represent descending 
levels of scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the government has 
the burden of proving that the challenged law’s classifications 
“are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling gov-
ernmental interests.”10 For over half a century, courts have ap-
plied strict scrutiny to government actions that infringe fun-
damental rights or discriminate based on race or national 
origin.11 The test was sufficiently rigid that Gerald Gunther 
once described the Warren Court’s approach as “‘strict’ in theo-
ry and fatal in fact,”12 a characterization from which the Burger 
Court later distanced itself.13 In any case, laws that discrimi-
nate based on race are generally struck down as violating the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Under intermediate scrutiny, “restrictions ‘will survive 
equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially 
related to a legitimate state interest.’”14 “Substantially related,” 
in turn, requires that the proffered explanation be “exceedingly 
persuasive,” and “not hypothesized or invented post hoc in re-
sponse to litigation.”15 Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to 
government actions that discriminate based on gender and ille-
gitimacy.16 The application of heightened scrutiny to gender 
discrimination in the 1970s was particularly significant, given 
 
 9. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–21 (1982), superseded by statute, 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), Pub. L. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. 
This Article will refer to strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny collec-
tively as “heightened scrutiny,” as distinguished from rational basis review. 
 10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 11. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1078. 
 12. Id. at 1079 (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
 13. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 14. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) 
(quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)). 
 15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
 16. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426 (Conn. 2008). 
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the Court’s prior decisions to endorse such discrimination.17 As 
Professor Bertrall Ross explains, “[T]he intermediate level of 
scrutiny was a mechanism through which the Court could dif-
ferentiate between laws based on ‘real’ gender differences and 
those based on stereotypes.”18 This level of heightened scrutiny 
has proven powerful in addressing the historic discrimination 
faced by American women.19 
Under rational basis review, “a statutory classification 
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose.”20 Non-suspect classifications are reviewed under this 
standard, which is typically extremely deferential.21 The gov-
ernment “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the 
rationality of a statutory classification.”22 The vast majority of 
government actions survive this level of scrutiny.23 
In addition to federal equal protection claims, civil rights 
lawyers can also pursue state equal protection claims. Many 
state constitutions define equal protection guarantees more 
broadly than the U.S. Constitution,24 which supplies a floor of 
protection upon which state constitutions can provide greater 
 
 17. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (upholding Illi-
nois prohibition against women practicing law), abrogated by Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971).  
 18. Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protec-
tion and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565, 
1594–95 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 19. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (using heightened scrutiny to strike 
down Virginia’s exclusion of women from citizen-soldier program offered at 
Virginia Military Institute). 
 20. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citing San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). 
 21. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1077–78 (“Not surprisingly, 
few government actions have ever been found unconstitutional under this 
test.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 723 (Conn. 2000) 
(“[D]epending upon the facts and circumstances, the state constitution may 
afford greater protection than the federal constitution with regard to equal 
protection claims.” (citing Barton v. Ducci Elec. Contractors, Inc., 730 A.2d 
1149 (Conn. 1999))); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948–
49 (Mass. 2003) (“The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protec-
tive of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may 
demand broader protection for fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of 
government intrusion into the protected spheres of private life.”); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999) (“[T]he Common Benefits Clause of the 
Vermont Constitution differs markedly from the federal Equal Protection 
Clause in its language, historical origins, purpose, and development.”). 
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protection.25 Similar to the federal approach, many state courts 
apply one of three different levels of scrutiny, depending on the 
characteristic upon which the challenged law discriminates.26 
In determining the proper level of scrutiny, state courts exam-
ine similar considerations to federal courts, including immuta-
bility and political power.27 However, because state courts are 
often more protective in their applications of equal protection 
doctrine, state courts may invalidate under the state constitu-
tion’s equal protection clause—or its equivalent—state laws 
that would survive scrutiny under federal law.28 Gay rights ad-
vocates have used this fact to successfully challenge state laws 
that discriminate based on sexual orientation.29 Nevertheless, 
many state courts treat rational basis review as similarly def-
erential under state constitutional analysis.30 Thus, the level of 
scrutiny remains important in state courts. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
The debate over the proper level of scrutiny is not merely 
academic. Scholars have long noted that the level of scrutiny is 
 
 25. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 420 (Conn. 2008) 
(“[F]ederal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national 
standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state gov-
ernments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (quoting 
State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 590 (Conn. 1995))). 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 423 (“We therefore apply the same three-tiered equal 
protection methodology that is applied under the federal equal protection 
clause for purposes of our state constitution.”). 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 429 (“Nevertheless, because the court has identified the 
immutability of the group’s distinguishing characteristic and the group’s mi-
nority status or relative lack of political power as potentially relevant factors 
to the determination of whether heightened judicial protection is appropriate, 
we, too, shall consider those factors for purposes of our inquiry under the state 
constitution.”). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 420 (“Therefore, although we may follow the analytical 
approach taken by courts construing the federal constitution, our use of that 
approach for purposes of the state constitution will not necessarily lead to the 
same result as that arrived at under the federal constitution.” (citing State v. 
Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 62–63 (Conn. 1990))). 
 29. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (holding 
that the “Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the Io-
wa Constitution”). 
 30. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 604 (Md. 2007) (“A statute 
subject to rational review often passes constitutional muster.” (citing Hargrove 
v. Bd. of Tr. of Md. Ret. Sys., 529 A.2d 1372, 1383 (1987))), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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often dispositive in equal protection cases.31 This is particularly 
true in gay rights litigation. Applying rational basis review, 
federal courts have upheld state laws that criminalized private 
homosexual conduct between consenting adults,32 state laws 
that ban gays from adopting children,33 and the military’s anti-
gay policies for decades.34 Gay litigants generally lose under the 
rational basis standard.35 
The major area where courts have used rational basis to 
strike down anti-gay laws is atypical: same-sex marriage bans. 
Prior to United States v. Windsor,36 which struck down DOMA, 
most courts employed rational basis review to uphold both state 
and federal laws that prohibited the legal recognition of same-
sex relationships, including marriage and rights associated 
with marriage.37 Some state courts applied heightened scrutiny 
 
 31. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1076 (“First, the rigid 
levels of scrutiny mean that unless alleged government discrimination re-
ceives heightened scrutiny the odds are overwhelming that the government 
will prevail.”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). 
 32. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 33. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
827 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 34. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding 
pre-DADT military policy to exclude gay servicemembers); see also High Tech 
Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding discriminatory policy to deny security clearances to gay applicants 
and employees). 
 35. One key exception is Romer v. Evans, in which the Supreme Court 
struck down Colorado’s amendment 2—which precluded local governments 
from prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation—under rational 
basis review. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). Some commenta-
tors explained Romer as an example of so-called “rational basis with bite.” 
While the prospect of applying rational basis with bite to anti-gay legislation 
is promising, Romer has not prevented lower courts from upholding such legis-
lation under rational basis review. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protec-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 761 (2011) (collecting examples); id. (“Rational 
basis with bite review is not equivalent to formal heightened scrutiny.”). 
 36. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 37. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(upholding DOMA); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006) (uphold-
ing New York same-sex marriage ban); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 
802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (denying same-sex couple stand-
ing to bring wrongful death suits); Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 
121, 123–24 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (denying family health insurance for same-
sex partners). 
  
1588 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1579 
 
under their state versions of the Equal Protection Clause to 
strike down their states’ bans on same-sex marriage.38 Before 
Windsor, the level of scrutiny was largely outcome determina-
tive in same-sex marriage cases.39 In this era, some judges ex-
plicitly noted that discriminatory marriage laws that would be 
invalidated under heightened scrutiny would survive rational 
basis review.40 For example, when the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals upheld that state’s same-sex marriage prohibition under 
rational basis review, the court’s chief judge noted that the law 
would not survive constitutional analysis if it were subjected to 
heightened scrutiny.41 
The potency of rational basis review—as applied to same-
sex marriage bans—changed considerably following Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor. After Windsor made a 
clear legal case for why state same-sex marriage bans were un-
 
 38. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn. 
2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
Immediately prior to Windsor, some federal courts held DOMA to be un-
constitutional under rational basis review. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (striking down 
DOMA); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 342 (D. Conn. 
2012) (same). 
Some courts debate the question of the appropriate standard of review for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation by concluding that the challenged 
policy does not survive rational basis review and thus determining whether 
sexual orientation is a suspect classification is unnecessary. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court and the Federal District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts did so explicitly by concluding that the state’s ban on same-sex mar-
riage failed the rational basis test. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 
2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010) (“This court need not address these arguments, 
however, because DOMA fails to pass constitutional muster even under the 
highly deferential rational basis test.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“For the reasons we explain below, we conclude 
that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due pro-
cess or equal protection.”). But see id. at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (“Alt-
hough ostensibly applying the rational basis test to the civil marriage statutes, 
it is abundantly apparent that the court is in fact applying some undefined 
stricter standard to assess the constitutionality of the marriage statutes’ ex-
clusion of same-sex couples.”). 
 39. Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage 
Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1086–87 (2014). 
 40. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 9–10. 
 41. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 697 (Md. 2007) (Bell, C.J., dissent-
ing), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Ander-
sen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (“Under the highly deferen-
tial rational basis inquiry, encouraging procreation between opposite-sex 
individuals within the framework of marriage is a legitimate government in-
terest furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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constitutional, federal and state courts invoked Windsor to in-
validate discriminatory state marriage laws, using both ration-
al basis review42 and heightened scrutiny.43 While courts used 
rational basis to strike down same-sex marriage bans, the situ-
ation is uncharacteristic because the Supreme Court had en-
tered the fray. Rational basis was sufficient in these post-
Windsor marriage cases because the Supreme Court had clear-
ly signaled the unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. 
Absent such clear guidance from the Supreme Court, gay liti-
gants do not fare so well. 
The marriage cases aside, when courts apply rational basis 
review, courts more often than not uphold laws that discrimi-
nate against gay Americans.44 In contrast, in cases in which the 
court has applied heightened scrutiny, anti-gay laws have al-
most invariably been struck down as violating equal protec-
tion.45 Sexual orientation provides a natural experiment to wit-
ness the importance of the level of scrutiny because courts are 
divided on whether or not to apply heightened scrutiny to anti-
gay laws. The following Section explains why courts have 
reached different conclusions. 
 
 42. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Kitchen 
v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff ’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2014). 
 43. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014); Love v. 
Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d. 536, 545 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. 
Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Greigo v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 
2013). 
 44. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 45. The history of same-sex marriage also shows how political actors per-
ceive that heightened scrutiny matters because anti-gay laws cannot survive 
close inspection. In the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision holding 
that same-sex marriage bans were a form of sex discrimination subject to 
strict scrutiny under Hawaiian law, Congress was so concerned that same-sex 
marriage bans would not survive heightened scrutiny on remand that it 
passed DOMA. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“Alt-
hough [Hawaii’s] decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, 
some States were concerned by its implications and reaffirmed in their laws 
that marriage is defined as a union between opposite-sex partners. So too in 
1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) . . . .”). After the 
Ninth Circuit held (in a non-marriage case) that sexual orientation was a sus-
pect classification, Nevada stopped defending its same-sex marriage ban be-
cause its Republican leaders did not believe the ban could survive heightened 
scrutiny. 
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C. SCRUTINY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
The Supreme Court has not clearly and consistently ap-
plied a definitive test for determining whether a classification 
is suspect and, thus, warrants heightened scrutiny. From the 
Court’s equal protection opinions, however, lower courts have 
divined a set of functional criteria. In considering claims that 
sexual orientation should be treated as a suspect classification, 
courts generally evaluate four factors: (1) whether the class has 
historically been subjected to discrimination; (2) whether the 
class members share a defining characteristic related to their 
ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) “whether the 
class exhibits ‘obvious, immutable, or distinguishing character-
istics that define them as a discrete group’”; and (4) “whether 
the class is ‘a minority or politically powerless.’”46 Most courts 
invoke these factors when discussing whether sexual orienta-
tion is a suspect classification.47 
 
 46. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bowen 
v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 606 (Md. 2007), abrogated 
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
Historically, some courts eschewed the factor test and relied on state sod-
omy laws to decline heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws. After the Supreme 
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), a substantive due process case, upheld the consti-
tutionality of state sodomy laws—which criminalized private sexual conduct 
between consenting adults—lower courts held that “if the government can 
criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference to that 
conduct cannot constitute a ‘suspect class.’” Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (“It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by 
conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict 
scrutiny under the equal protection clause.”). Some judges criticized this line 
of reasoning by noting that Bowers did not involve any equal protection claim. 
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The error 
of using Bowers to deny treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification 
has been abated by the Supreme Court’s reversal of Bowers in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Courts have explained that “reasoning . . . that 
laws discriminating against gay men and lesbians are not entitled to height-
ened scrutiny because homosexual conduct may be legitimately criminalized, 
cannot stand post-Lawrence.” Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 465 (Conn. 2008) (“[I ]n Lawrence v. Texas, the United 
States Supreme Court overruled Bowers, thus removing the precedential un-
derpinnings of the federal case law supporting the defendants’ claim that gay 
persons are not a quasi-suspect class.”). 
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This four-factor test is easier to articulate than to apply 
with any consistency or precision. Laying out a numbered list 
creates an appearance of structure and definiteness that is illu-
sory because it remains unclear “how these criteria are 
weighted or what combination triggers heightened scrutiny.”48 
For example, some courts believe that the first two factors are 
more important than the last two.49 But other courts have re-
quired all four factors, essentially treating the four factors as 
four elements.50 Yet even the Supreme Court sometimes omits 
individual factors in its discussions.51 
Applying these criteria, both federal and state courts have 
split on the issue of whether sexual orientation constitutes a 
suspect classification. While many courts have held that laws 
that discriminate against gay Americans are subject to height-
ened scrutiny,52 most courts have held to the contrary.53 The 
 
 48. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper 
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 739 (2008); see also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Sus-
pect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 168 (2011) (“The Court has 
never described how the factors exist in relation to each other, explained 
which factors are to be given priority, or clarified how much weight to assign 
any particular factor.”). 
 49. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427 (“It is evident, moreover, that immuta-
bility and minority status or political powerlessness are subsidiary to the first 
two primary factors . . . .”). 
 50. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606. 
 51. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 888 n.16 (Iowa 2009) (“The Su-
preme Court has not required, nor even discussed, every factor in every 
case.”). 
 52. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 
481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to 
equal protection claims involving sexual orientation.”); Windsor v. United 
States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In this case, all four factors justi-
fy heightened scrutiny: A) homosexuals as a group have historically endured 
persecution and discrimination; B) homosexuality has no relation to aptitude 
or ability to contribute to society; C) homosexuals are a discernible group with 
non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in the subset of those 
who enter same-sex marriages; and D) the class remains a politically weak-
ened minority.”), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989 
(“Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level 
of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual ori-
entation is heightened scrutiny.”); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 
(Cal. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that sexual orientation should be viewed as a sus-
pect classification for purposes of the California Constitution’s equal protec-
tion clause and that statutes that treat persons differently because of their 
sexual orientation should be subjected to strict scrutiny under this constitu-
tional provision.”), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 
1, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412 (“[S]exual orientation constitutes a qua-
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first two factors are easily satisfied. First, no one seriously 
challenges the fact that gay people have historically suffered 
from significant discrimination.54 Courts and commentators 
have noted that government officials and society at large have 
subjected known and suspected homosexuals to castration, lo-
botomies, shock therapy, aversion therapy, witch hunts, and 
widespread discrimination, making it impossible for many gay 
people to live safe, productive, and healthy lives.55 Thus, courts 
uniformly conclude that “gay persons have been subjected to 
such severe and sustained discrimination because of our cul-
ture’s long-standing intolerance of intimate homosexual con-
duct.”56 Second, sexual orientation is irrelevant to one’s capabil-
ities. Over the past two to three decades, courts have finally 
come to recognize that “sexual orientation . . . bears no relation 
whatsoever to an individual’s ability to perform, or to partici-
pate in, or contribute to, society.”57 These first two factors, thus, 
 
si-suspect classification for purposes of the equal protection provisions of the 
state constitution, and, therefore, our statutes discriminating against gay per-
sons are subject to heightened or intermediate judicial scrutiny . . . .”); id. at 
444 (stating that the court had “little difficulty in concluding that gay persons 
are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent politi-
cal progress”). 
 53. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 464 (“[T]he vast majority of federal circuit 
courts that have considered the issue have concluded that sexual orientation is 
not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and, consequently, legislation 
that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to rational basis re-
view.”). 
 54. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“[H]omosexuals have 
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility . . . .”); see also 
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606 (noting that there is “a history of purposeful une-
qual treatment” of gay and lesbian persons); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 
963, 1029 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting) (“Legal authorities do not dis-
pute the fact that gays and lesbians have been subjected to a history of dis-
crimination.”), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Dean 
v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 344–45 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., dissent-
ing) (“Discrimination against homosexuals has been pervasive in both the pub-
lic and the private sectors.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; EVAN 
GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE 
FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 66 (1999) (“In fact, no court has 
ever denied suspect-class status to gays and lesbians on the ground that they 
have not suffered a history of discrimination.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609. 
 56. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 433. 
 57. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. 
Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 
1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (“If homosexuals were af-
flicted with some sort of impediment to their ability to perform and to contrib-
ute to society, the entire phenomenon of ‘staying in the [c]loset’ and of ‘coming 
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are not particularly important in denying heightened scrutiny 
of anti-gay laws. 
Regarding the third factor, several opinions have held that 
sexual orientation is not a suspect classification because homo-
sexuality is mutable.58 The immutability factor used to provide 
the major hurdle to courts treating sexual orientation as a sus-
pect classification. However, the significance and application of 
the immutability factor have evolved. First, many courts treat 
immutability as less important than the first two factors.59 Se-
cond, some courts have reframed the immutability factor to be 
less about the impossibility of changing a characteristic than 
about the reprehensibility of the state demanding someone 
change that characteristic. The Connecticut and Iowa Supreme 
Courts, for example, held that sexual orientation satisfied the 
immutability factor because “the identifying trait is ‘so central 
to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government 
to penalize a person for refusing to change [it].’”60 Most modern 
opinions, however, hold that “[s]exual orientation and sexual 
identity are immutable.”61 This is consistent with the bulk of 
 
out’ would not exist; their impediment would betray their status.”); see also 
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609 (“[H]omosexual persons are subject to unique disa-
bilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute to society . . . .”). 
 58. See, e.g., Conaway, 932 A.2d at 616 (“In the absence of some generally 
accepted scientific conclusion identifying homosexuality as an immutable 
characteristic . . . we decline . . . to recognize sexual orientation as an immuta-
ble trait . . . .”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974 n.6 (noting that although the Court 
“recognize[d] that th[e] question [of whether homosexuality is an immutable 
trait] is being researched and debated across the country . . . and . . . offer[ed] 
no opinion as to whether such a showing may be made at some later time,” 
plaintiffs in that case failed to make a showing of immutability). 
 59. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008) 
(“[I]mmutability is not invariably required in order for a characteristic to be 
considered a suspect classification for equal protection purposes.”). 
 60. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 
699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009). 
 61. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); see 
also High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d, 375, 377 
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (“There is every reason to regard homo-
sexuality as an immutable characteristic for equal protection purposes. . . . 
Sexual identity is established at a very early age; it is not a matter of con-
scious or controllable choice.”); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 864 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Same-sex sexual orientation persists in all societies and has 
proven to be almost completely resistant to change or ‘treatment,’ despite 
widespread discrimination and social pressure against homosexuals.”), rev’d 
on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Equal. Found. of Greater Cin-
cinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at 426 (“Sexual orientation is set in at a very early 
age . . . and is not only involuntary, but is unamenable to change.”); Gay 
Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 
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scientific research, which proves that sexual orientation has a 
large genetic component and is neither chosen nor changeable 
by individual willpower.62 For these reasons, the immutability 
factor is less of an impediment to treating sexual orientation as 
a suspect classification. 
With the first two factors favoring heightened scrutiny for 
sexual orientation and the evolving understanding of the im-
mutability factor, the political power inquiry has become the 
focus for most courts considering whether sexual orientation is 
a suspect classification. If gay Americans lack political power, 
they should be entitled to heightened scrutiny. However, what 
should be a relatively straightforward inquiry is anything but, 
as Part II explains. 
II.  THE POLITICAL POWER INQUIRY   
A. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE POLITICAL POWER 
INQUIRY 
The political power component of equal protection analysis 
has its roots in the most famous footnote in constitutional law. 
The Supreme Court in Footnote Four of Carolene Products not-
ed the importance of “whether prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”63 
Footnote Four provided the basis for considering whether the 
political process has failed to protect minority rights such that 
the courts should provide more thorough oversight. Subsequent 
courts have converted the footnote’s language into an inquiry 
as to whether the members of a group targeted by—or dispro-
portionately impacted by—a law or government action are po-
litically powerless. 
 
34–35 (D.C. 1987) (“[H]omosexuality is as deeply ingrained as heterosexuali-
ty. . . . Neither homosexuals nor heterosexuals are what they are by design.”). 
 62. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLI-
CIES 787 (3d ed. 2006) (“[R]ecent research suggests that sexual orientation is 
immutable and not a matter of individual choice.”); see also Jantz v. Muci, 759 
F. Supp. 1543, 1547–48 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that the overwhelming majori-
ty of scientific evidence indicated that sexual orientation could not be changed 
and is not subject to voluntary control). 
 63. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (ci-
tations omitted). 
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Courts and scholars have posited a range of related ration-
ales for examining whether the members of a group lack politi-
cal power before giving that group the protection of heightened 
scrutiny. The equal protection doctrine—including the political 
power inquiry—serves the function of correcting failures of the 
political process.64 Greater scrutiny is necessary when members 
of a minority “are relatively powerless to protect their interests 
in the political process.”65 Conversely, groups that have mean-
ingful political power can use the political process to protect 
their rights, and thus do not require heightened scrutiny.66 
When groups cannot protect themselves through the ordi-
nary operation of law-making and law enforcement, courts need 
to more closely scrutinize laws that discriminate against those 
groups. In an academic article, Justice Lewis Powell explained 
that the Carolene Products opinion established that “there are 
certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the politi-
cal process. And the political process therefore cannot be trust-
ed to protect these groups in the way it protects most of us.”67 
These groups are entitled to heightened scrutiny of laws and 
policies that discriminate against their members.68 
Furthermore, laws that target politically powerless groups 
are more likely to reflect prejudice.69 The Supreme Court in 
Cleburne noted that “when a statute classifies by race, alien-
 
 64. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 80 (1980); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: 
Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 975, 981 (2014) (“[A] fundamental justification for the suspect class 
doctrine . . . [is] to correct political process failures.”); see also GERSTMANN, 
supra note 54, at 27 (“The challenge, then, is for the Court to properly identify 
those groups that are so powerless or despised that they cannot effectively 
participate in the pluralistic political process. These groups are ‘suspect clas-
ses’ and should be strongly protected by the courts.”). 
 65. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973). 
 66. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726–27 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, 
J., concurring) (“Courts are understandably reluctant to extend heightened 
protection under equal protection doctrine to groups fully capable of securing 
their rights through the political process.”). 
 67. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1087, 1089 (1982). 
 68. Id. (noting that courts should use heightened scrutiny to review legis-
lation that would harm minorities because they are unable to protect them-
selves in the legislative process). 
 69. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 712 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concur-
ring) (“Discriminations that burden some despised or politically powerless 
groups are so likely to reflect antipathy against those groups that the classifi-
cations are inherently suspect and must be strictly scrutinized.”). 
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age, or national origin[,] . . . such considerations are deemed to 
reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the bur-
dened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.”70 If the 
targeted group does not have political power, then prejudice 
can prevail and lawmakers have little incentive to protect that 
minority’s rights.71 This combination of prejudice and political 
powerlessness warrants requiring the government to prove that 
the challenged law is “suitably tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.”72 
Different courts have afforded varying weight to the politi-
cal power inquiry. On the one hand, some judges and scholars 
have taken the position that political powerlessness is not nec-
essary to entitle a group to heightened scrutiny.73 For example, 
some federal judges have held that political powerlessness “is 
not essential for recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class.”74 Similarly, some states do not require political power-
lessness as an element.75 Other judges, however, have observed 
 
 70. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see 
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008) (“[A]s 
a minority group that continues to suffer the enduring effects of centuries of 
legally sanctioned discrimination, laws singling [gay persons] out for disparate 
treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that those laws 
are not the product of such historical prejudice and stereotyping.”). 
 71. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The ‘political powerlessness’ of a group and the im-
mutability of its defining trait are relevant insofar as they point to a social and 
cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect or be con-
cerned with that group’s interests and needs.”). 
 72. Id. at 440 (“For these reasons and because such discrimination is un-
likely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to 
strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989–90 (S.D. 
Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), 
rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (“Lack of political 
power is not essential for recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect class . . . .”); 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009) (“Supreme Court jurispru-
dence establishes that a group’s current political powerlessness is not a pre-
requisite to enhanced judicial protection.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection 
Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (detailing the history of political 
powerlessness as a consideration in equal protection cases). 
 74. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2014), appeal 
dismissed sub nom. Whitewood v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Health, 621 Fed. App’x 
141 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 75. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (“Alt-
hough some California decisions in discussing suspect classifications have re-
ferred to a group’s ‘political powerlessness’, our cases have not identified a 
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that although political powerlessness is not strictly required, 
the factor can help establish heightened scrutiny.76 Some courts 
give less weight to the political power factor than other fac-
tors.77 One reason that some courts have not emphasized the 
political power factor is the difficulty in applying the factor 
across different groups. For example, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court noted that “the court has accorded little weight to a 
group’s political power because that factor, in contrast to the 
other criteria, frequently is not readily discernible by reference 
to objective standards.”78 
Conversely, many other courts have treated the political 
power inquiry as highly relevant.79 For example, in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,80 the Supreme Court 
denied heightened scrutiny to the poor, in part because they 
have not been “relegated to such a position of political power-
lessness as to command extraordinary protection from the ma-
joritarian political process.”81 Professor Darren Lenard 
 
group’s current political powerlessness as a necessary prerequisite for treat-
ment as a suspect class.”). 
 76. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The ‘political powerlessness’ of a group may be relevant, 
but that factor is neither necessary, as the gender cases demonstrate, nor suf-
ficient, as the example of minors illustrates.”); Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
989 (“Lack of political power is not essential for recognition as a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, but the limited ability of gay people as a group to protect 
themselves in the political process also weighs in favor of heightened scrutiny 
of laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation.” (citation omitted)); 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.2d 968, 989 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (noting that the political powerlessness “factor is not an absolute pre-
requisite for heightened scrutiny,” though finding that gay men and lesbians 
lack political power). 
 77. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 454 n.52 (Conn. 
2008) (“[T]o the extent that the Supreme Court has considered the political 
power of a group in determining whether it is entitled to suspect or quasi-
suspect class status, it has accorded that prong the least amount of weight.”). 
 78. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 428 (“Thus, an attempt to quantify a group’s po-
litical influence often will involve a myriad of complex and interrelated consid-
erations of a kind not readily susceptible to judicial fact-finding.”). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 466 (Baxter, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]everal courts holding that sexual orienta-
tion is not a suspect class have focused particularly on a determination that, 
in contemporary times at least, the gay and lesbian community does not lack 
political power.”); see also Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1015 (“Frontiero, 
Plyler, and Rowland all lead to the conclusion that Brennan (and the Court) 
has considered political powerlessness relevant to the suspect class doctrine 
and to the application of heightened scrutiny.”). 
 80. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 81. Id. at 28. 
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Hutchinson has noted that “legal scholars and courts have 
overwhelmingly treated political powerlessness as a significant 
factor in the suspect class doctrine.”82 Indeed, some scholars ar-
gue that courts sometimes treat political powerlessness as the 
most important criterion.83 
Most importantly for our purposes, courts have treated the 
political power inquiry as dispositive when holding that sexual 
orientation is not a suspect classification. For example, in eval-
uating its state ban on same-sex marriage, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals concluded: 
While there is a history of purposeful unequal treatment of gay and 
lesbian persons, and homosexual persons are subject to unique disa-
bilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute to society, 
we shall not hold that gay and lesbian persons are so politically pow-
erless that they constitute a suspect class.84 
A federal district court considering the military’s prohibition on 
gay servicemembers “reject[ed] plaintiff ’s argument that homo-
sexuals constitute a suspect class” because “[a]lthough plaintiff 
may have submitted sufficient evidence to create a triable issue 
of material fact as to whether homosexuality is an ‘immutable’ 
characteristic, he has failed to submit any pertinent evidence 
tending to establish that homosexuals lack legislative power.”85 
Similarly, the trial court in Romer held that “[h]omosexuals fail 
to meet the element of political powerlessness and therefore fail 
to meet the elements to be found a suspect class.”86 These cases 
 
 82. Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1016; see also Levy, supra note 1, at 44 
(“[R]elative political powerlessness was an important consideration in many 
cases recognizing or declining to recognize a suspect class or classification, and 
the Court has never rejected it as a factor in determining whether to heighten 
scrutiny.”). 
 83. E.g., Strauss, supra note 48, at 153 (“[S]ome courts consider political 
powerlessness to be the ultimate question and view the other factors as 
subissues.”). 
 84. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609 (Md. 2007). The court also de-
clined to find that sexual orientation was immutable, but the court suggested 
that its decision on immutability was influenced by its earlier holding that gay 
people were not politically powerless. See id. at 616 (“In the absence of some 
generally accepted scientific conclusion identifying homosexuality as an im-
mutable characteristic, and in light of the other indicia used by this Court and 
the Supreme Court in defining a suspect class, we decline on the record in the 
present case to recognize sexual orientation as an immutable trait and there-
fore a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.”). 
 85. Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993). 
 86. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *12 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aff ’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff ’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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demonstrate that the political power factor can be decisive in 
denying heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws.87 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE POLITICAL POWER INQUIRY 
The political power factor can be both controlling and con-
fusing. This Section reviews several critiques of the factor. 
First, it remains unclear how political power is measured, as 
illustrated by the conflicting approaches that courts have taken 
regarding the political power of gay people. Second, comparing 
groups granted heightened scrutiny to those denied heightened 
scrutiny exposes important inconsistencies in equal protection 
jurisprudence. Finally, this Section explores how courts have 
made the political power factor impossible to satisfy. 
1. The Measurement of Political Power 
While judges have discussed political power for decades, 
they have never developed any accepted criteria for measuring 
such power. By way of a case study, courts have split on the 
factual question of whether gays are politically powerless be-
cause courts have employed different measurement criteria and 
have sometimes interpreted the same standard dissimilarly to 
reach contradictory conclusions.88 For example, judges finding 
that gays have considerable political power note that some laws 
exist to protect gay people’s rights.89 Such judges have also 
 
 87. See GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 81 (“Thus, along with the percep-
tion that homosexuality is a behavioral rather than an immutable characteris-
tic, the perception of substantial gay and lesbian political power has proven to 
be a major obstacle to gays and lesbians attaining suspect-class status.”); see 
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 454 (Conn. 2008) (not-
ing that dissent’s “view [that] gay persons are not entitled to heightened pro-
tection, even though they meet the first three criteria, because the political 
power of gay persons overrides those three considerations”). 
 88. Compare Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio 
2013) (“As political power has been defined by the Supreme Court for purposes 
of heightened scrutiny analysis, gay people do not have it.”), rev’d sub nom. 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), with Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609 (“[W]e shall 
not hold that gay and lesbian persons are so politically powerless that they 
constitute a suspect class.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 89. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 
F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013), and Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 
2008), as recognized in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 
471 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 466–67 (Cal. 2008) 
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting), superseded by constitutional amend-
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tried to lower the bar for proving that gays have political power 
by arguing that it is sufficient that gays can attract the atten-
tion of lawmakers.90 Conversely, courts finding that gays lack 
political power often emphasize the absence of relevant laws to 
protect gay Americans from discrimination.91 Furthermore, the-
se courts have noted that the existence of anti-gay laws shows 
that gays do not have political power.92 
Putting gay legislative victories in context, many judges 
have emphasized the difficulty that gays face trying to over-
come the deep-seated prejudice against members of the LGBT 
community. Most notably, in the Supreme Court’s first oppor-
tunity to consider the issue, Justice William Brennan, joined by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, recognized that gay people “are 
particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the po-
litical arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the 
object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say 
that discrimination against homosexuals is ‘likely . . . to reflect 
deep-seated prejudice rather than . . . rationality.’”93 Building 
on this theme, the Second Circuit explained that “[t]he question 
is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes 
 
ment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (2008), as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 90. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574; Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 
454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1102 
(D. Haw. 2012), vacated, 585 Fed. App’x 413 (9th Cir. 2014); Dahl, 830 F. 
Supp. at 1324. 
 91. E.g., Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (“One way gay men, lesbians, 
and bisexuals’ lack of power is demonstrated is by the absence of statutory 
protections for them.”); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (M.D. Pa. 
2014) (“While the gay rights movement has undoubtedly gained recognition as 
a vigorous force and has influenced public policy to some extent, there remains 
an absence of statutory, anti-discrimination protections which may indicate 
continuing political weakness.”); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 960 
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (“The fact that gays and lesbians lack significant political 
power in Michigan is amply demonstrated by the fact that there are no laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation . . . .”); Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894–95 (Iowa 2009) (noting the absence of inclusive 
marriage laws); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 461 (“[T]he political advances 
that gay persons have attained afford them inadequate protection . . . .”). 
 92. E.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2014) 
(“[T]he history of same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the his-
torical lack of political power possessed by gays and lesbians.”); Golinski v. 
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting 
“there is no federal anti-discrimination legislation and no protection in most 
states from sexual orientation discrimination”). 
 93. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 
(1982)). 
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over the years; they clearly have. The question is whether they 
have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrong-
ful discrimination.”94 This, gay Americans cannot yet do, as the 
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that “the relatively modest 
political influence that gay persons possess is insufficient to 
rectify the invidious discrimination to which they have been 
subjected for so long.”95 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court con-
cluded that “gay and lesbian people are not so politically power-
ful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history 
suggests produces discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.”96 Gay people have to overcome so much historical preju-
dice that true political power, including the ability to make po-
litical compromises with other more powerful groups, is still 
inaccessible despite some isolated successes.97 In contrast, those 
courts finding that gays have political power ignore this dy-
namic and argue that just because gays are targeted by anti-
gay laws does not mean that they do not have political power.98 
Courts have also diverged in their treatment of the signifi-
cance of openly gay elected lawmakers. The Seventh Circuit 
found political power in the fact that “[Time Magazine] reports 
 
 94. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012); see also 
Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (“In sum, the basic inability to bring about an 
end to discrimination and pervasive prejudice, to secure desired policy out-
comes and to prevent undesirable outcomes on fundamental matters that di-
rectly impact their lives, is evidence of the relative political powerlessness of 
gay and lesbian individuals.”). 
 95. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 461. 
 96. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 895; see also Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 
882–83 (N.M. 2013) (“Refocusing on the contention that the LGBT community 
is not politically powerless, we recognize that they have had some recent polit-
ical success regarding legislation prohibiting discrimination against them. 
However, we also conclude that effective advocacy for the LGBT community is 
seriously hindered by their continuing need to overcome the already deep-
rooted prejudice against their integration into society, which warrants our ap-
plication of intermediate scrutiny in this case.”). 
 97. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 98. E.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing trial court holding that gay people consti-
tute a quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny), vacated, 518 U.S. 
1001 (1996); Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *11–12 (D. 
Colo. 1993); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986) (upholding Mis-
souri’s sodomy law under rational basis review), abrogated by Glossip v. Mo. 
Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. 
2013); see also Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1001 (critiquing trial court’s 
analysis in Evans v. Romer); Emily K. Baxter, Rationalizing Away Political 
Powerlessness: Equal Protection Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbi-
ans, 72 MO. L. REV. 891, 903–04 (2007) (same). 
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that one congressman is an avowed homosexual, and that there 
is a charge that five other top officials are known to be homo-
sexual.”99 The court did not explain how this created political 
power sufficient to eliminate the need for heightened scrutiny. 
Conversely, more courts have noted that exceedingly few gay 
individuals hold positions of power.100 These low numbers limit 
the ability of gay people “to prevent legislation hostile to their 
group interests.”101 Some courts note that pointing to the rare 
examples of openly gay politicians better illustrates a lack of 
political power rather than its abundance.102 
Courts also disagree on the legal implications of the closet. 
For example, one Nevada district court judge, in holding that 
gays have political power, argued that gays did not have it so 
bad because, although sodomy laws had criminalized the very 
identity of gay men and lesbians, “the need or desire to keep 
 
 99. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (conclud-
ing that “[h]omosexuals are not without political power”); see also Kerrigan, 
957 A.2d at 441 (indicating that the defendants unsuccessfully argued “that 
gay persons are not entirely without political power” in part “because some 
gay persons serve openly in public office”). 
 100. E.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 447 (“No openly gay person ever has been 
appointed to a United States Cabinet position or to any federal appeals court. 
In addition, no openly gay person has served in the United States Senate, and 
only two currently serve in the United States House of Representatives.”); see 
also Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 1030 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., con-
curring in dissent) (“But there are other indicators. In Washington, there are 
only four openly gay legislators—none in a statewide executive or judicial ca-
pacity.”), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Courtney 
A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of 
LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 394–95 (2010) (“The current number of LGBTs 
serving in our law-making institutions is far short of proportional representa-
tion. Only .69%, or three, members of Congress are openly LGBT. Only .01%, 
or seventy-four, of our states’ legislative representatives are openly LGBT.”). 
 101. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 102. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The recent articles BLAG cites are exceptions and not the 
rule. While President Obama nominated four openly-gay judges, there are lit-
erally hundreds of federal judges nationwide.”). 
For a critique of counting public representatives to measure a group’s po-
litical power, see Strauss, supra note 48, at 159 (“Determining a group’s politi-
cal powerlessness by the number of public representatives of that group in po-
sitions of power suffers from three problems. First, numbers are not an 
accurate measure of power. Second, courts do not employ a clear definition of 
underrepresentation or adequate representation. Third, this factor suggests 
that the level of scrutiny must be constantly reevaluated over time, a task that 
is not embraced by courts.”). 
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one’s sexual orientation secret because of such laws, though 
perhaps regrettable, would have no effect on one’s ability to 
vote, serve on a jury, or otherwise participate in American de-
mocracy.”103 Most courts to consider the issue, however, recog-
nize that the ability of gay Americans to exert political influ-
ence is significantly diminished by the fact that discrimination 
forces gay people to conceal their sexual orientation. For exam-
ple, a federal judge in Kansas noted that when gay people are 
forced to conceal their sexual orientation in order to avoid “the 
harsh penalties imposed by society on persons identified as 
homosexual . . . [i]t may allow a given individual to escape from 
the discrimination, abuse, and even violence which is often di-
rected at homosexuals, but it ensures that homosexuals as a 
group are unheard politically.”104 This echoes Justice Brennan’s 
observation: “Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium 
often manifested against homosexuals once so identified public-
ly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue 
their rights openly in the political arena.”105 Fear of public hos-
tility and prejudice, including physical violence, keeps many 
gays, including legislators, in the closet.106 Closeted representa-
tives often do not protect the LGBT community,107 and often are 
among the most aggressively anti-gay legislators, in an attempt 
to conceal their homosexuality.108 Ultimately, the closet pre-
vents gay people from mobilizing to advance a pro-equality po-
litical agenda,109 and that means that “the voices of many ho-
mosexuals are not even heard, let alone counted.”110 
 
 103. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1011 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d 
sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 104. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d on other 
grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Dean v. District of Columbia, 
653 A.2d 307, 349 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Prejudice has prevented some homosexuals from coming out of the 
‘closet’ and joining gay rights organizations that can increase their political 
power.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 105. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 106. See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013), 
rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 107. Powers, supra note 100, at 394. 
 108. See, e.g., ROBERT BAUMAN, THE GENTLEMAN FROM MARYLAND: THE 
CONSCIENCE OF A GAY CONSERVATIVE (1986) (giving an autobiographical ac-
count of the life of a closeted, “ultraconservative” congressman who was ar-
rested by the FBI for soliciting sex with an underage male prostitute). 
 109. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012); see al-
so Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Mo-
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In concluding that sexual orientation is a suspect classifi-
cation, many courts have examined relative political power. 
Some courts finding gays to satisfy the political powerlessness 
factor have noted that “the standard is not whether a minority 
group is entirely powerless, but rather whether they suffer 
from relative political weakness.”111 While gay Americans have 
achieved greater political and social acceptance as they have 
come out of the closet and disproved prejudice-based stereo-
types, any absolute gains are offset and diminished by the po-
litical influence of opponents of gay rights who are often more 
powerful, with deep pockets and an obsession for opposing 
equal rights.112 Because of this organized opposition, gays must 
work harder and longer to achieve basic rights, which suggests 
 
rality and the Trial of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1057, 
1067–68 (1994) (noting that Professor Kenneth Sherrill has “explained that 
the fear of many lesbians, gay men and bisexuals of identifying themselves 
and coming together for public advocacy inhibits political organizing”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1994) (“Pre-
cisely because [homosexuals] are often anonymous (that is, not known to be 
homosexual) and diffuse (that is, not tightly organized), they face large barri-
ers to exerting adequate political influence. . . . The ability to conceal can ac-
tually make things worse from the standpoint of exercising political power.”). 
 110. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In addition, homosexuals as a group 
are handicapped by structural barriers that operate to make effective political 
participation unlikely if not impossible. First, the social, economic, and politi-
cal pressures to conceal one’s homosexuality operate to discourage gays from 
openly protesting anti-homosexual governmental action.”); see also Dean v. 
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 349–50 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 111. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 n.7 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
 112. DAVID RAYSIDE, ON THE FRINGE: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN POLITICS 14 
(1998) (“[I]n the United States, . . . opponents of gay and lesbian rights have 
been able to mobilize grassroots support on a scale unimaginable for gay activ-
ist organizations.”); see also RAYSIDE, supra, at 9 (“But any analysis of the po-
litical significance of such resources [controlled by gay Americans] must take 
into account the extraordinary power of the American Christian right.”); Kenji 
Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme 
Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 527, 538 (2012) (noting that in the litigation over 
California’s Proposition 8, “Professor Gary Segura of Stanford . . . observed 
that the political power of opponents to gay rights (specifically certain reli-
gious denominations) significantly diminished the political power of the gay 
community”). 
Even when the LGBT community obtains political success, their gains are 
often repealed through referenda. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 883 (N.M. 
2013). 
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that gays suffer a relative deficit of political power.113 In con-
trast to the above analysis, those courts asserting that gay peo-
ple have significant political power have not considered these 
issues of relativity. 
This brief review of how courts have evaluated the political 
power of gay Americans demonstrates how difficult it is to 
measure political power with any precision or consistency. 
What exactly courts mean by political powerlessness remains 
elusive.114 There are many indicia that courts sometimes in-
voke, but there is no uniformity across cases. Even when judges 
agree on what gets weighed, disagreement prevails on how to 
weigh.115 
2. The Symmetry of Political Power 
Courts have been unable to apply a coherent standard of 
“politically powerless” across groups. This failure is evident in 
the incongruence of which groups receive heightened scrutiny 
compared to gay people. For example, women get heightened 
scrutiny even though they are a majority of the population116 
and have more political power than gays;117 indeed, gay Ameri-
cans have less political power now than women did when the 
Supreme Court provided intermediate scrutiny to women in the 
1970s.118 Similarly, as a political force, gay Americans arguably 
 
 113. See Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1005. 
 114. See Lawrence Friedman, Not the Usual Suspects: Suspect Classifica-
tion Determinations and Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 
61, 76 (2010) (“Application of that factor involves inquiries into the meaning of 
political events that may well defy judicial understanding or the possibility of 
judicial limitation; political events often cannot be reduced to a single mean-
ing.”). 
 115. See id. at 75–76. 
 116. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 338 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“And, of course, women are not a 
minority.”); see also Levy, supra note 1, at 42 (“It is hard to see how complete 
political powerlessness could be a requirement in light of Frontiero and Craig 
v. Boren, insofar as women make up at least half of the voting population.”). 
 117. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(“The relative lack of political influence of gay people today stands in contrast 
to the political power of women in 1973, when a plurality of the Court conclud-
ed in [Frontiero] that sex-based classifications required heightened scrutiny.”); 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 461 (Conn. 2008) (“Today, 
moreover, women have far greater political power than gay persons, yet they 
continue to be accorded status as a quasi-suspect class.”); Powers, supra note 
100, at 395. 
 118. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895 (Iowa 2009) (“Gays and lesbi-
ans certainly possess no more political power than women enjoyed four dec-
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have less power than African Americans.119 Yet courts that hold 
gays have too much political power to receive heightened scru-
tiny never compare the two groups.120 There is simply no rea-
sonable way to reconcile the political power analysis of those 
cases that deny heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws and those 
that afford such protection to women and racial minorities.121 
Moreover, because courts have treated gender and race as 
suspect classifications—instead of simply treating women and 
racial minorities as protected classes—laws that adversely af-
fect men and Caucasians also receive heightened scrutiny.122 
Thus, the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to 
 
ades ago when the Supreme Court began subjecting gender-based legislation 
to closer scrutiny.”); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 452 (“With respect to the compara-
tive political power of gay persons, they presently have no greater political 
power—in fact, they undoubtedly have a good deal less such influence—than 
women did in 1973, when the United States Supreme Court, in Frontiero, held 
that women are entitled to heightened judicial protection.”). 
 119. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 453 (“[G]ay persons clearly lack the political 
power that African-Americans and women possess today.”); Dean, 653 A.2d at 
351 (“[H]omosexuals—because of their tendency, overall, toward anonymity 
and diffusion, rather than discreetness and insularity—tend to have consider-
ably less political power than African-Americans, a protected racial minori-
ty.”). 
 120. GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 83 (“[C]ourts are applying a very dif-
ferent standard to gays and lesbians than they have been applying to other 
groups. No court has been willing to evaluate the political power of women or 
racial minorities by the same standard that they have applied to gays and les-
bians.”); see also Baxter, supra note 98, at 904. 
 121. See GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 81 (“The only logical standard of 
comparison is other suspect or quasi-suspect classes such as racial minorities 
or women. If these groups are sufficiently powerless to be suspect or quasi-
suspect classes, then logically gays and lesbians must be, at a minimum, more 
politically powerful than these groups if they are in fact too powerful to be a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class.”). 
One could argue that courts focus on the classification when dealing with 
race and gender, but focus on the class when dealing with anti-gay laws. But 
this is an explanation, not a reconciliation. Why, after all, should courts look 
at classifications for some equal protection claims and classes for others? 
 122. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (finding 
that male jurors have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures 
that are free from historical prejudice); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (“That this statutory policy discriminates against males 
rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the 
standard of review.”). 
This suspect classification approach is inconsistent with a political power 
requirement because both men and women cannot be politically powerless, 
just as both whites and nonwhites cannot simultaneously lack political power. 
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 502–
03 (2004). 
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strike down a state law that allowed women between the ages 
of eighteen and twenty-one to purchase low-alcohol beer, but 
not similarly aged men.123 The men bringing the suit were not 
required to prove lack of political power; they could not have.124 
Similarly, laws that affect white people adversely receive 
heightened scrutiny from courts.125 When white plaintiffs chal-
lenge affirmative action policies as violating the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, courts have applied strict scrutiny.126 These plain-
tiffs have never had to show that white people are politically 
powerless. Courts have avoided the inquiry because it would be 
ludicrous to conclude that white people in America do not have 
political power when they occupy the vast majority of seats in 
Congress and every state legislature. Thus, race-based classifi-
cations receive strict scrutiny without any inquiry into the 
plaintiffs’ political power.127 
Caucasians and men receive heightened scrutiny because 
courts are applying the anti-classification theory of equal pro-
tection, as opposed to the anti-subordination theory. While an-
ti-classification theory may provide a justification for treating 
all racial and gender classifications as suspect, courts have ex-
plained neither why sexual orientation is an acceptable classifi-
cation nor why the political power factor is employed against 
gay plaintiffs but not white or male plaintiffs pursuing equal 
protection claims. No court that has refused to apply height-
ened scrutiny to anti-gay laws has ever attempted to explain 
how gay Americans have too much political power to qualify for 
greater protection but Caucasians and men do not. Because 
this state of affairs is indefensible, courts do not defend it; most 
courts, however, choose to perpetuate it. All of this illustrates 
an asymmetry in the application of the political power factor 
that suggests that courts are, at best, inconsistent and, at 
worst, disingenuous. 
 
 123. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 124. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 12–13 (“Moreover, the Court’s gender dis-
crimination cases often involved male plaintiffs who were disadvantaged by 
gender-based state policies, such as Oklahoma’s rule that eighteen- to twenty-
year-old women could purchase three percent beer but same-aged men could 
not—the policy struck down in Craig v. Boren. At almost half of the popula-
tion, and by far the wealthier half, men are far from politically powerless.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 126. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–96 (1989). 
 127. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 12 (“If political powerlessness was a re-
quirement for strict scrutiny, almost all of these affirmative action cases were 
wrongly decided.”). 
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3. The Impossibility of Political Powerlessness 
Another major problem with the political power inquiry is 
that courts apply the factor impractically in a manner that is 
all but impossible to satisfy. In order to establish that it is po-
litically powerless and entitled to heightened scrutiny, a group 
must have some modicum of political power.128 Women and ra-
cial minorities, for example, did not receive heightened scrutiny 
until they had attained sufficient political power.129 The truly 
powerless do not receive protection from the courts130 because 
that group “will never even get on the Court’s radar”131 and “the 
Court will not even recognize its existence.”132 Professor Kenji 
Yoshino refers to this phenomenon as “the paradox of political 
power.”133 
 
 128. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 24–25 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court’s prac-
tice inverts the demands of the political powerlessness requirement. When a 
social group is totally powerless, the Court will not subject the group’s stigma-
tizing trait to heightened scrutiny. Once the minority has achieved some polit-
ical power, then the Court may intervene with strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, or rational basis with bite.”); Yoshino, supra note 112, at 539 (“As a 
matter of practice, a group usually must have significant political power before 
the Court grants it heightened scrutiny.”). 
 129. Yoshino, supra note 112, at 541–42 (“When women were granted 
heightened scrutiny in 1976, the Congress had passed the Equal Rights 
Amendment and many states had ratified it.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862, 894 (Iowa 2009). 
It may seem odd to talk about the political power of women and racial mi-
norities if heightened protection for gender and racial discrimination are 
based on anti-classification theory, and not anti-subordination theory. But the 
fact that women and racial minorities did not receive heightened scrutiny un-
til they had sufficient political power suggests that the boundary between an-
ti-classification theory and anti-subordination theory is porous and confusing. 
 130. See Eskridge, supra note 73, at 19 (“The hypothesis that emerges from 
these cases is that, as a matter of its own practice, the U.S. Supreme Court 
will not provide a high level of equal protection scrutiny when the state is de-
ploying a suspicious classification against a minority that is totally power-
less.”). 
 131. Yoshino, supra note 112, at 539. 
 132. Id. at 541. 
 133. Id. (“A paradox of political power attends judicial review. It could be 
stated as follows: A group must have an immense amount of political power 
before it will be deemed politically powerless by the Court.”). 
The dynamic plays out in the relationship between state and federal pro-
tection of minorities. The Supreme Court generally will not move much more 
quickly than the majority of states have moved on a particular issue. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court declined to hold miscegenation laws and sodomy 
laws unconstitutional until the vast majority of states had already repealed or 
invalidated these laws. The Court’s inclination to wait until the states have 
acted creates a problem, however, because if the states have moved to protect 
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For decades, gay people were too politically powerless to 
have their claims taken seriously by the judiciary. When, in the 
1970s, gay couples first argued that same-sex marriage bans 
were unconstitutional, courts rejected the couples’ constitution-
al arguments out of hand, often “without discussion.”134 The 
Supreme Court dismissed appeals of such losses “for want of a 
substantial federal question,” despite the fact that same-sex 
couples were arguing that the challenged marriage prohibitions 
violated the U.S. Constitution.135 The Court’s disdain for the 
rights of gay people was hardly surprising given that the Su-
preme Court in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice136 held that “Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic 
personality’ to include homosexuals” and that homosexuals 
were properly excluded from the country.137 Professor Eskridge 
has explained that “[o]ne sad lesson from Boutilier is that if a 
minority group is totally powerless, because of social prejudice 
or pervasive stereotyping, the Equal Protection Clause will not 
protect that group.”138 In short, the same social prejudice that 
produces anti-gay laws leads judges to protect these laws from 
judicial invalidation.139 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will only label a group as 
politically powerless if the group can hit an undefined sweet 
spot with the perfect combination of the presence and absence 
of political power.140 As the judicial treatment of gay people 
 
a group, then courts might claim that this shows that the group has political 
power and is, thus, not entitled to heightened scrutiny. 
 134. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 n.2 (1971), appeal dismissed, 
409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 135. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodg-
es, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 136. 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
 137. Id. at 120. 
 138. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 18. 
 139. See id. (“If social prejudice is so pervasive, will not judges themselves 
be prejudiced, to some extent, against the minority group? Chief Justice War-
ren and Justice Black, leaders of the Warren Court revolution in race and 
criminal procedure, were prejudiced against gay people. It was easy for such 
judges to believe that all males who have ever had sex with men were ‘homo-
sexuals,’ that ‘homosexuals’ are ‘psychopaths,’ and that judges should support 
state pogroms against such ‘psychopathic’ people.”). 
 140. See id. at 19 (“Heightened scrutiny will be possible only once the mi-
nority group has shown some political power, albeit not enough to sweep away 
all of the encrusted, and irrational or unproductive, discrimination against its 
members.”). 
One could argue that noncitizens did not have political power when the 
Supreme Court decided Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Gra-
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shows, that sweet spot may not exist. For decades, gays were 
legally labeled as psychopaths and criminals,141 labels that were 
both a cause and a consequence of gay people being politically 
powerless.142 Courts sometimes used the lack of legislative pro-
tection for gay people as the reason to deny heightened scrutiny 
and, thus, reduce any judicial protection for gay people target-
ed by discriminatory laws.143 But any movement towards equal-
ity was used against gay people seeking heightened scrutiny of 
remaining anti-gay laws.144 In short, the necessary sweet spot of 
“political powerlessness” is either ephemeral or fictional. 
III.  A GEOGRAPHICAL LENS OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
ANALYSIS   
A. THE LOCUS OF DISCRIMINATION 
Gay Americans live in every state, in every county, of the 
United States. Wherever they live, gay people face the risk—
and often, the reality—of discrimination by their own govern-
ment. This Section reviews how all levels of government have 
discriminated against, and failed to protect, the LGBT popula-
tion. 
1. Federal Discrimination 
The federal government has actively and passively sup-
ported discrimination against gay Americans. First, Congress 
and federal agencies have enacted unequivocally anti-gay laws 
and policies. During the mid-to-late twentieth century, Con-
gress excluded homosexuals from immigrating by labeling them 
as psychopathic personalities.145 The federal government has 
long discriminated against gay employees in ways both subtle 
and overt. President Eisenhower issued an executive order to 
prohibit all homosexuals from all government employment. 
 
ham Court never mentioned political power in its opinion. 
 141. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted 
by ‘Unenforced’ Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000) (ex-
plaining how sodomy laws stigmatize gays by labeling them as criminals). 
 142. Eskridge, supra note 73, at 26–27. 
 143. See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), 
abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 144. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614 n.56 (Md. 2007) (“The irony 
is not lost on us that the increasing political and other successes of the expres-
sion of gay power works against Appellees in this part of our analysis of the 
level of scrutiny to be given the statute under review.”). 
 145. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
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During the McCarthy era, “literally thousands of men and 
women were discharged or forced to resign from civilian posi-
tions in the federal government because they were suspected of 
being gay or lesbian.”146 For the entirety of the twentieth centu-
ry, the U.S. military officially forbade openly gay and lesbian 
Americans from serving their country in uniform. Congress 
codified this policy in 1993 with the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” (DADT) policy, “pursuant to which a service member who 
has engaged in, intends to engage in or is likely to engage in 
homosexual conduct will be ordered separated from the armed 
services.”147 When states began to consider recognizing same-
sex marriage, Congress passed the misnamed Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA), which prohibited federal agencies from 
treating legally married same-sex couples as being married for 
the purposes of federal law, including for tax, immigration, and 
Social Security purposes, among others. 
Although the most strident anti-gay federal policies are no 
longer in place, the successes in eliminating them largely come 
not from the political power of gays but from judicial protection. 
Courts, for example, were critical in reversing the federal gov-
ernment’s anti-gay employment policies.148 More recently, when 
Congress did eventually repeal DADT in 2011, it did so in the 
shadow of a federal court decision invalidating the policy as un-
constitutional and permanently enjoining the federal govern-
ment from enforcing the policy.149 Judicial action, in this case, 
spurred and informed the legislative action. And DOMA would 
still prevent federal recognition of same-sex marriage but for 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Windsor, striking the law 
down.150 
 
 146. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432–33 n.25 (Conn. 
2008) (quoting GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING 
TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 6 (2004)); see also DAVID JOHNSON, THE 
LAVENDER SCARE (2004) (describing the persecution of gays and lesbians dur-
ing the McCarthy era). 
 147. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432 n.25. 
 148. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that 
an employee’s alleged homosexuality did not justify dismissal); Scott v. Macy, 
402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reversing an action of the United States Civil 
Service Commission denying an applicant public employment “on the ground 
that he had engaged in ‘immoral conduct’”); Soc’y for Individual Rights, Inc. v. 
Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (reinstating a gay employee who had 
been improperly discharged from his federal civil service position). 
 149. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 
(C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 150. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see infra note 238 
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Furthermore, Congress has declined to pass anti-
discrimination laws to protect gay Americans. For over four 
decades, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) has 
been introduced in Congress. ENDA would merely add sexual 
orientation to the categories of characteristics on which em-
ployers may not discriminate. Despite the fact that a majority 
of Americans support the measure, Congress has failed to pro-
tect gay workers against invidious discrimination.151 In addition 
to ENDA, Congress has declined to enact proposed legislation 
that would address health disparities for LGBT Americans and 
improve their access to the health care system.152 Before Wind-
sor and Obergefell made same-sex marriages legal across the 
country, Congress refused to pass legislation to “prohibit the 
taxation of benefits provided for domestic partners under em-
ployers’ health plans” and to “permit Americans to sponsor 
their same-sex partner for family-based immigration.”153 If gay 
Americans really had political power at the federal level, it 
would be relatively easy to include sexual orientation into exist-
ing nondiscrimination laws. 
Finally, Congress has explicitly carved out gay Americans 
from the protection of broad-based civil rights legislation. For 
example, when Congress enacted the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, it unequivocally excluded gay men, lesbians, 
and bisexuals from protection from discrimination.154 Even 
when adopting the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Congress 
stipulated that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed, nor 
shall any funds appropriated to carry out the purpose of the Act 
be used, to promote or encourage homosexuality.”155 While less 
harmful than aggressively discriminatory policies, like DADT 
and DOMA, these carve-outs communicate Congress’s disdain 
and disrespect for gay Americans. 
 
(discussing the irony of anti-gay legislators defending DOMA while claiming 
that gays have too much political power to qualify for heightened scrutiny). 
 151. Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 955, 964 (2012); William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An 
Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 69–72 (2001). 
 152. Powers, supra note 100, at 396 n.87. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012) (“[H]omosexuality and bisexuality are not 
impairments and as such are not disabilities under this chapter.”). 
 155. Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 
§ 2(b); see also Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime into Focus—the 
Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 278 (1991). 
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2. State Discrimination 
State-based anti-gay discrimination has been a distinct 
problem for gay Americans since the nation’s founding. Until 
the 1960s, every state in the union criminalized homosexual 
conduct through sodomy laws. These laws made private same-
sex activity between consenting adults illegal. Criminal penal-
ties were excessive to the point of irrational cruelty. As of the 
mid-1950s, at least nine states had a twenty-year maximum 
sentence for such private conduct, Connecticut had a thirty-
year maximum sentence and North Carolina had sixty years; 
the laws of Colorado, Georgia, and Nevada provided for a life 
sentence for a sodomy conviction.156 States, however, did not 
primarily enforce their sodomy laws through criminal prosecu-
tions. Various state boards relied on sodomy laws to deny pro-
fessional licenses to gay men and lesbians in many fields, in-
cluding medicine, law, and teaching.157 Many private employers 
followed suit and maintained policies against employing gay 
men and lesbians, who were considered de facto criminals.158 
Sodomy laws were also used to deny redress to any gay man or 
lesbian fired on account of sexual orientation. The courts rea-
soned that if gay men and lesbians were criminals because of 
their sexual orientation, surely their sexual orientation could 
not be the basis for an employment discrimination claim.159 
Sodomy laws were also used to rationalize taking children 
away from their gay parents, to prevent gays from organizing 
to protect their rights, and to justify discrimination against gay 
men and lesbians in immigration,160 housing,161 and enforce-
ment of solicitation statutes.162 Finally, sodomy laws also en-
couraged anti-gay violence163 and deterred police departments 
 
 156. Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., An Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender, 41 
MINN. L. REV. 187, 190 (1957). 
 157. Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 509, 512–13 (2005) (“Mere suspicion of homosexuality was 
enough to fire a teacher for violating the state’s sodomy law.”). 
 158. Id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the 
Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and 
Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 911 (1997) (“In 1961, virtual-
ly all state and federal government agencies discriminated against employees 
thought to be gay or lesbian, a discrimination aped by the private sector.”). 
 159. E.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 160. Leslie, supra note 141, at 164–68. 
 161. State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 162. Leslie, supra note 141, at 162–63. 
 163. Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 
1994 UTAH L. REV. 209, 233; see also Leslie, supra note 141, at 122–27. 
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from protecting gay victims of crimes.164 In short, even gay men 
and lesbians who did not violate sodomy laws were considered 
presumptive felons and, consequently, discriminated against. 
States slowly began to abolish their sodomy laws, until the Su-
preme Court in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003 ruled them unconsti-
tutional. But the discrimination regarding employment and 
family law—often associated with sodomy laws—remained in 
most jurisdictions. 
The family law regimes of many states are infused with 
anti-gay prejudice. When same-sex couples sought marriage 
equality, most states amended their state constitutions or civil 
codes to explicitly prohibit any legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages. Although Obergefell has extended the constitutional 
right to marry to include same-sex couples, many states con-
tinue to discriminate against gay families. For example, some 
states expressly prohibit adoptions by gays and lesbians.165 As 
with federal anti-gay laws, their demise is more likely through 
judicial invalidation than legislative repeal.166 
Like the federal government, most states have declined to 
protect their gay citizens and visitors from invidious discrimi-
nation; both private and governmental actors are free to dis-
criminate against members of the LGBT community.167 In the 
aftermath of Obergefell, many states are proposing so-called re-
ligious freedom laws that would explicitly authorize and em-
power discrimination against gay individuals and couples.168 
 
 164. Leslie, supra note 141, at 124–25.  
 165. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2016) (“Adoption by couples of 
the same gender is prohibited.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-102(4) (LexisNexis 
2012) (“The Legislature specifically finds that it is not in a child’s best interest 
to be adopted by a person or persons who are cohabiting in a relationship that 
is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.”). 
Michigan amended its adoption laws to allow publicly funded adoption agen-
cies to refuse adoptions to same-sex couples if this conflicts with the agency’s 
religious beliefs. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.23g (West 2015). 
 166. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 
So. 3d 79, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (striking down Florida’s prohibition on 
gays adopting children). 
 167. Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1031 (“Today, most states still permit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by private and governmental 
actors.”). 
 168. See Jacquelyn Cooper, Modern Day Segregation: States Fighting to Le-
gally Allow Businesses To Refuse Service to Same-Sex Couples Under the 
Shield of the First Amendment, 15 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 413, 414 (2014) 
(“Over half a dozen states have introduced bills that would allow businesses, 
religious organizations, and even public servants to not recognize same-sex 
marriage and, as a result, discriminate against gay individuals.”). 
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Social conservatives have focused their anti-gay efforts primari-
ly at the state, not the federal, level.169 Many states do not have 
meaningful gay rights organizations in place to either make the 
affirmative case for gay equality or to defend themselves 
against anti-gay legal campaigns.170 
3. Local Discrimination 
Many local governments actively target gay people for dis-
crimination. Local governments regularly permit or require 
discrimination against gay police officers, firefighters, and city 
clerks. Local school districts routinely discriminate against 
teachers and school administrators.171 Local discrimination of-
ten finds voice in ballot initiatives—often spearheaded by polit-
ically powerful religious groups—to excise sexual orientation 
from local nondiscrimination ordinances.172 The voters of Cin-
cinnati, for example, amended that city’s charter to excise the 
LGBT community from the city’s antidiscrimination ordinances 
and to preclude restoring any protected status.173 Some cities 
use their zoning power to deny gay and gay-friendly establish-
ments necessary licenses to operate.174 Indeed, some local offi-
cials have declared their cities to be “straight town[s]” where 
gay people are not welcome.175 Gays do not have political power 
in areas where the electorate views itself as religiously opposed 
 
 169. See AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 113–14 (2012). 
 170. See generally id. (noting how absence of state organizations proves 
detrimental to gay equality). 
 171. See, e.g., Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs., 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Many state laws also discriminate against gay students. For example, “in nine 
states, school officials are statutorily prohibited from providing LGBT stu-
dents with the information, advice, or acknowledgement necessary to support 
this vulnerable student population.” Jillian Lenson, Litigation Primer Attack-
ing State “No Promo Homo” Laws: Why “Don’t Say Gay” Is Not O.K., 24 TUL. 
J.L. & SEXUALITY 145, 146–47 (2015); see also id. at 147 (“These laws convey 
an unambiguous message that homosexuality is so immoral that even its very 
existence must be denied.”). 
 172. See STONE, supra note 169, at 8 (“And in a survey of local nondiscrim-
ination ordinances from 1972 to 1993, more than one out of three passed ordi-
nances that include sexual orientation was challenged in efforts to overturn it. 
If anything, this data suggests an underestimation of attempted anti-gay di-
rect legislation.”). 
 173. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 
F.3d 289, 289 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 174. Luke A. Boso, Urban Bias, Rural Sexual Minorities, and the Courts, 
60 UCLA L. REV. 562, 584 (2013). 
 175. Id. at 584 n.117 (2013) (discussing the proclamation of Gulfport, Mis-
sissippi councilman Billy Hewes). 
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to homosexuality, and gays are unlikely to avoid discrimination 
in such regions in the short term without judicial protection.176 
B. THE REGIONAL VARIATION OF POLITICAL POWER OF GAY 
AMERICANS 
Making accurate, sweeping generalizations about the polit-
ical power of gay Americans nationwide is difficult. The legal 
treatment of gay Americans varies wildly across states. Legis-
latures in some states have acted to protect their gay citizens 
from discrimination, while others have endorsed discrimina-
tion. Voters in statewide initiatives have generally opposed 
equality for their gay brethren, but exceptions exist when vot-
ers have supported gay rights. 
1. Comparisons of Gay Political Power Across States 
Some states may be characterized as gay protective. In 
mid-twentieth century America, states were relatively equal in 
their mistreatment of—and their failure to protect—gay people. 
Beginning in 1961, however, differences began to emerge. In 
that year, Illinois repealed its sodomy law. Eventually other 
states followed suit until by the mid-1980s, half of the states 
had eliminated their sodomy laws through either legislative re-
peal or judicial invalidation. Beyond ceasing the criminaliza-
tion of sexual orientation, states in the 1980s began affirma-
tively protecting gay people from discrimination. Beginning in 
Wisconsin in 1982, several states have included sexual orienta-
tion in their statewide antidiscrimination laws.177 Some gay-
protective states include sexual orientation in their hate-crimes 
statutes.178 During the national debate over same-sex marriage, 
most states legalized same-sex marriage through judicial ac-
tion, but a few states achieved marriage equality through legis-
lative votes or statewide referenda. These are indicia of politi-
cal power. 
 
 176. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 445 (Conn. 
2008) (“Feelings and beliefs predicated on such profound religious and moral 
principles are likely to be enduring, and persons and groups adhering to those 
views undoubtedly will continue to exert influence over public policy mak-
ers.”). 
 177. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding 
the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 286 (1994). 
 178. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2008); In re Joshua H., 
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 293 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993) (upholding Califor-
nia’s hate crime statute that included sexual orientation). 
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California stands as an example of a state whose legisla-
ture has moved to protect its gay citizens on a variety of fronts. 
By statute, California bans discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation in health care plans,179 insurance,180 housing,181 em-
ployment,182 jury service,183 and education.184 More broadly, Cali-
fornia’s Unruh Act ensures that, regardless of sexual 
orientation, all persons “are entitled to the full and equal ac-
commodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in 
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”185 Cali-
fornia has also been at the forefront in gay-protective legisla-
tion, being the first state to enact laws requiring the teaching 
of gay history in public schools and prohibiting anti-gay repara-
tive therapy. These legislative victories suggest that gay Cali-
fornians possess a modicum of political power.186 
In contrast to gay-protective states, such as California, gay 
people clearly lack political power in the many states that have 
been affirmatively hostile to gay rights. Gays are essentially 
politically powerless in states whose sodomy laws were invali-
dated only by Lawrence v. Texas.187 After all, gay people in the 
 
 179. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5(a) (West 2016) (“No health care 
service plan or specialized health care service plan shall refuse to enter into 
any contract or shall cancel or decline to renew or reinstate any contract be-
cause of . . . sexual orientation . . . .”). 
 180. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(a) (West 2013) (“[S]exual orientation shall not, 
of itself, constitute a condition or risk for which a higher rate, premium, or 
charge may be required of the insured for that insurance.”). 
 181. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 (West 2011). 
 182. Id. § 12940. 
 183. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.5 (West 2006). 
 184. ROBERT D. LINKS, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGA-
TION § 11:6 (West 2016) (“The prohibition against sexual orientation discrimi-
nation in the Education Code was accomplished by the insertion of the phrase 
‘or any basis that is contained in the prohibition of hate crimes set forth in 
subdivision (a) of Section 422.6 of the Penal Code’ into [the Education Code].”). 
 185. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2016). 
 186. Yet, even protective states remain problematic. In California, after the 
state’s supreme court held that denying same-sex couples the right to marry 
violated the California Constitution, the voters overturned the decision by 
amending the state constitution with Proposition 8, which precluded same-sex 
marriages. A federal judge struck down Proposition 8 as unconstitutional un-
der heightened scrutiny. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
995 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff ’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 187. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Several states, including Texas, took great efforts 
to defend their sodomy laws against invalidation, often through procedural 
manipulations. Christopher R. Leslie, Procedural Rules or Procedural Pre-
texts?: A Case Study of Procedural Hurdles in Constitutional Challenges to the 
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thirteen states that continued to criminalize homosexuality un-
til Lawrence had insufficient political power to prevent them-
selves from being labeled as felons and thus subject to employ-
ment discrimination, having their children taken away in 
custody disputes, and other collateral consequences.188 Still to-
day, approximately half of the states do not include sexual ori-
entation in their statewide nondiscrimination laws;189 this 
makes it legal for employers, landlords, and retailers to dis-
criminate against gay people, potentially rendering gay people 
jobless, homeless, and unable to shop in stores or eat in restau-
rants.190 In most states, these are not innocent omissions; in-
deed, several states have tried or proposed to prevent any city 
within the state from including sexual orientation in its local 
nondiscrimination ordinance.191 Moreover, the multitude of an-
ti-gay state laws are all evidence that the gay people targeted 
by these laws lack political power.192 
The political powerlessness of gays is also demonstrated by 
states trying to silence gay people. By making it legal to dis-
criminate based on sexual orientation, states attempt to force 
gay people into the closet in order to prevent them from exercis-
ing power. In the 1980s, Oklahoma defended the constitutional-
ity of its law that provided for the termination of teachers who 
advocated “private homosexual activity,” which meant that “[a] 
teacher who went before the Oklahoma legislature or appeared 
on television to urge the repeal of the Oklahoma anti-sodomy 
statute” could be fired for exercising his or her free speech 
rights.193 The Tenth Circuit struck down the law as violating 
 
Texas Sodomy Law, 89 KY. L.J. 1109, 1149 (2001); see also Christopher R. 
Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing Doctrine To 
Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29, 40–
44 (arguing that state courts have invoked federal standing doctrine to argue 
that because sodomy laws are not enforced, there is no injury). 
 188. Leslie, supra note 141, at 137–68 (describing examples of employment 
discrimination, custody discrimination, discrimination against gay organiza-
tions, discriminatory enforcement of solicitation statutes, and immigration 
discrimination against homosexuals). 
 189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 190. Even in states without statewide protection, gays may have protection 
against discrimination in cities with local nondiscrimination ordinances that 
include sexual orientation, though some states have tried to nullify such local 
protections. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
 191. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 192. See infra notes 197–99, 211–14 and accompanying text. 
 193. Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270, 
1274 (10th Cir. 1984), aff ’d, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). 
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the First Amendment,194 a decision upheld by an equally divid-
ed Supreme Court.195 Today, nine states continue to try to pre-
vent students from knowing that gay people can be well-
adjusted and happy;196 these states have enacted so-called “No 
Promo Homo” laws, which forbid school teachers from discuss-
ing homosexuality except as a mechanism for transmitting dis-
eases.197 For example, Texas law provides that “[c]ourse materi-
als and instruction relating to sexual education or sexually 
transmitted diseases should include: . . . (8) emphasis . . . that 
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public 
and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under Sec-
tion 21.06, Penal Code.”198 The law still exists more than a dec-
ade after the Supreme Court held section 21.06 unconstitution-
al in Lawrence v. Texas. Texas is not exceptional in this 
regard.199 
The fact that so many unconstitutional laws, such as Okla-
homa’s anti-speech law, are enacted to discriminate against 
gays also shows an absence of political power. Most notably, the 
Supreme Court has struck down state sodomy laws and state 
same-sex marriage bans. These decisions followed from the first 
Supreme Court decision to strike down an anti-gay state law, 
Romer v. Evans, which invalidated Colorado’s amendment 2.200 
Lower federal courts have invalidated anti-gay state laws, gen-
erally on grounds unrelated to equal protection. For example, 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Nat’l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. at 903. 
 196. Lenson, supra note 171, at 147 (listing Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah as 
having “No Promo Homo” or “Don’t Say Gay” laws); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and 
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1359 (2000) 
(suggesting that public education is a common locus of no promo homo poli-
cies). 
 197. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5) (2014) (“The program of in-
struction provided for in this section may not include a discussion of alternate 
sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships including, but not limited to, 
homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction concerning sex-
ually transmitted diseases.”). 
 198. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002 (West 1991). 
 199. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (1992) (“Course materials and instruc-
tion that relate to sexual education or sexually transmitted diseases should 
include all of the following elements: . . . (8) An emphasis, in a factual manner 
and from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle ac-
ceptable to the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal of-
fense under the laws of the state.”). 
 200. See supra notes 35, 109, and accompanying text. 
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Alabama enacted a law that forbade the use of public funds by 
any college or university to recognize or support any group that 
“promote[d] a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sodomy and 
sexual misconduct laws,” which effectively denied funds (and 
on-campus banking privileges) to student gay rights organiza-
tions.201 The Eleventh Circuit held that the law violated the 
First Amendment.202 State courts, too, have invalidated anti-
gay state laws. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
struck down a child welfare regulation that provided that “[n]o 
person may serve as a foster parent if any adult member of that 
person’s household is a homosexual” as violating the separation 
of powers doctrine.203 These anti-gay laws illustrate both the 
inability of gays to protect themselves in the political process 
and the need for judicial scrutiny. 
Some judges have suggested that these judicial victories 
are evidence of the political power of gay Americans. For exam-
ple, in holding that gay people have too much political power to 
qualify for heightened scrutiny, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
reasoned, in part, that “judicial trends toward reversing vari-
ous forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation under-
score an increasing political coming of age.”204 The court is mis-
taken; judicial invalidation of unconstitutional laws does not 
demonstrate political power. Courts are—at least theoretical-
ly—not political. The fact that the federal and state govern-
ments are passing unconstitutional anti-gay laws and that gay 
people consistently need judicial protection to invalidate these 
 
 201. Gay Lesbian Bisexual All. v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 
1997) (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-28 (1995)). 
 202. Id. at 1550. 
 203. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1, 3, 8 (Ark. 2006) 
(quoting Ark. Reg. § 200.3.2 (Jan. 1999)). 
 204. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 613 (Md. 2007), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
The Maryland Supreme Court implied that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Romer v. Evans, in which the court struck down amendment 2, demonstrat-
ed that gays had political power. Id. at 612–13 (discussing Romer and Law-
rence, and indicating that “[e]volutionary legal developments highlighting 
changing views toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons are not 
limited to statutory and regulatory enactments”). 
Courts should not be using Romer as evidence that gays have political 
power. The episode behind Romer shows the utter lack of political power that 
gay people had in Colorado in the early 1990s. The fact that the court system 
protected gays from unconstitutional discrimination is not evidence of political 
power; rather, it should be evidence that the political process failed to protect 
gays from discrimination, which is an argument in favor of heightened scruti-
ny for gay citizens. 
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discriminatory laws is stronger evidence of the lack of political 
power that gay Americans endure. 
In some states, gays are constantly under attack from anti-
gay legislators. Oklahoma stands as an example. In the first 
month of 2016 alone, Oklahoma legislators introduced at least 
twenty-six anti-LGBT bills, including proposed laws that would 
allow businesses to discriminate against gay individuals and 
gay couples, would allow adoption agencies to refuse service to 
gay people, would deter gay students from talking to school 
counselors by requiring outing such students to their (poten-
tially homophobic) parents, would prevent municipalities in 
Oklahoma from passing gay-inclusive nondiscrimination laws, 
and would specifically allow conversion therapy against gay 
youth, including “physical pain, such as electroshock or electro-
convulsive therapy, touch therapy, pornography exposure or 
vomit-induction therapy, in order to . . . eliminate or reduce 
sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward individuals of 
the same sex.”205 
Some might interpret the eventual failure of some anti-gay 
proposals to become law as proof of gay political power. It is 
not. Even successes at the ballot box or state legislatures in de-
feating proposed anti-gay laws are not necessarily evidence of 
political power because gay Americans are largely playing de-
fense. Politically powerful opponents of basic equality constant-
ly force gay Americans to spend their time, energy, and re-
sources to defend themselves against anti-gay legislative 
proposals and initiatives. Indeed, this is the strategy of equali-
ty opponents: distract gay people and their allies and force 
them to play defense so that they have insufficient resources to 
make affirmative gains towards equality.206 For example, “an 
anti-gay campaign industry developed . . . in Oregon, ‘where 
the drafting, circulation, and qualification of antigay initiatives 
 
 205. Mark Joseph Stern, The Latest Anti-Gay Oklahoma Bills Are Almost 
Too Crazy To Believe, SLATE: OUTWARD (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/outward/2016/01/28/oklahoma_anti_gay_bills_on_conversion_therapy_ 
and_blood_testing_are_crazy.html (quoting the forms of aversion therapy that 
a proposed law would protect from legal challenge); see also Zack Ford, Okla-
homa Sets New Record for Attempts To Discriminate Against LGBT People, 
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/oklahoma-sets-new 
-record-for-attempts-to-discriminate-against-lgbt-people-8f24d927bbe2# 
.3qskwmkkr (listing dozens of proposed anti-gay laws in Oklahoma). 
 206. See STONE, supra note 169, at 6 (summarizing Religious Right tactics 
such as changing the type, subject, and jurisdiction of anti-gay referendums 
and initiatives). 
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became something of a cottage industry.’ Through the coordi-
nated efforts of one group, the Religious Right can flood LGBT 
communities with anti-gay ballot initiatives, depleting re-
sources and dividing group efforts.”207 When gay rights groups 
had to defend against statewide DOMA initiatives, they could 
not effectively lobby for nondiscrimination protections or hate-
crimes legislation.208 In many of these battles over gay rights, a 
“win” does not advance gay rights; it merely preserves a status 
quo that is often unfavorable to gay equality.209 Resources are 
also diverted from other activities to make life better for gay 
people in hostile areas. In short, opponents of civil rights win 
even if appears that they lose because their goal was to distract 
and divert, not to necessarily achieve a majority of votes. 
In sum, this brief sketch demonstrates that gays can have 
political power in some states, but not others. 
2. Regional Variations of Political Power Within States 
In addition to inter-state differences regarding the political 
power of gays, intra-state differences also exist. In many states, 
some cities have enacted gay-inclusive nondiscrimination ordi-
nances. This creates asymmetries within states, especially in 
those without statewide nondiscrimination laws that include 
sexual orientation. In small conservative towns, officials are 
more likely to commit, than to guard against, anti-gay discrim-
ination.210 Gay people in rural areas are often particularly in 
need of legal protections.211 Consequently, rural gays are often 
politically powerless and badly need heightened scrutiny to 
preserve their rights.212 The asymmetry of legal protections can 
 
 207. Id. at 10 (quoting Todd Donovan et al., Direct Democracy and Gay 
Rights Initiatives After Romer, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 165 (Craig A. 
Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000). 
 208. Id. at 135. 
 209. See id. at 44. 
 210. Boso, supra note 174, at 601–02 (“[W]here local and state politicians 
represent predominately conservative, older, and blue-collar constituencies, 
and where progay groups spend little time and resources . . . local lawmakers 
are not likely to combat antigay discrimination independently . . . .”). 
 211. Id. at 566 (“Sexual minorities are uniquely vulnerable in many small 
towns and rural areas. Social discrimination and limited economic opportuni-
ties can leave them restricted in their ability to live freely and comfortably in 
their homes, and many predominately rural places lack even basic legal pro-
tections from discrimination based on sexual orientation.”). 
 212. See id. at 602 (“For rural sexual minorities, then, courts often provide 
the most realistic and affordable avenue for vindicating rights.”). 
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compel many gay people to move from relatively hostile cities to 
more protective—or at least less discriminatory—cities.213 
Some states have considered eliminating these intra-state 
variations by affirmatively denying nondiscrimination protec-
tions to gays statewide. Gay-hostile states not only refuse to 
protect gay people; many have tried to prevent all cities within 
their state from including sexual orientation in local nondis-
crimination ordinances. For example, in response to Aspen, 
Boulder, and Denver adopting gay-inclusive nondiscrimination 
laws, Colorado voters passed amendment 2, which would have 
prevented any discrimination claim based on sexual orientation 
anywhere in the state. After the Supreme Court struck down 
amendment 2 for singling out gay people for non-protection, 
several states have proposed more facially neutral schemes to 
achieve a similar result to amendment 2. In Arkansas and 
Tennessee, legislators enacted state laws that preclude munici-
palities from protecting any groups not included in statewide 
nondiscrimination laws.214 Because these states refuse to pro-
tect gay people from discrimination, these laws prevent locali-
ties from doing so as well and essentially nullify any political 
power enjoyed by gays at a local level. 
In sum, whether gay Americans have political power de-
pends on where they reside. Gays in California may possess 
some meaningful political power while gays in Oklahoma do 
not. Gays in Austin may possess political power even though 
Texas does not have a statewide gay-inclusive nondiscrimina-
tion law. In contrast, gays in Fayetteville, Arkansas may not 
have meaningful political power because even though the city is 
 
Judicial recourse is critical in these jurisdictions because, as Professor 
Doug NeJaime explains, “[c]ourts generally have an obligation to hear and 
consider a group’s grievance, even when lawmakers do not provide a forum. 
And because courts enjoy some degree of independence, they may advance the 
group’s cause even when political actors and the general public remain rela-
tively hostile.” Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 663, 665 (2012). 
 213. See, e.g., Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 151, at 958 (arguing that 
some cities use their powers to improve the lives of gay and lesbian residents). 
 214. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403(a) (West 2015) (“A county, municipality, 
or other political subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordi-
nance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or pro-
hibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.”); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 7-51-1802(a)(1) (West 2016) (“No local government shall by ordinance, 
resolution, or any other means impose on or make applicable to any person an 
anti-discrimination practice, standard, definition, or provision that shall devi-
ate from, modify, supplement, add to, change, or vary in any manner from 
[state law].”). 
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gay-friendly, the state legislature has forbidden all Arkansas 
cities from protecting their gay residents and visitors against 
discrimination. Political power is, in effect, a function of geog-
raphy. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION 
JURISPRUDENCE   
When courts discuss whether a group seeking heightened 
scrutiny possesses political power, they tend to make sweeping 
pronouncements, untethered to geography. This Part shows 
that the answer to the question of whether a group is politically 
powerless depends on where you look. And courts often look in 
the wrong place. 
A. FEDERAL LAW, STATE/LOCAL LENS 
In cases involving equal protection challenges to federal 
laws, courts invoke examples of gay legislative victories at the 
state and local level in order to deny heightened scrutiny and to 
uphold anti-gay laws under rational basis review. For example, 
in 1989, the Seventh Circuit upheld the U.S. Army’s policy of 
disqualifying gay men and lesbians from military service.215 In 
reversing a lower court’s decision to apply heightened scrutiny, 
the appellate court held that sexual orientation did not consti-
tute a suspect classification, in part, because “[h]omosexuals 
are not without political power.”216 The court came to this con-
clusion based on three data points: “one congressman is an 
avowed homosexual, and . . . there is a charge that five other 
top officials are known to be homosexual,” and “the Mayor of 
Chicago participated in a gay rights parade.”217 Yet, the Sev-
enth Circuit is not the only court to conclude that a single 
mayor’s participation in a gay rights parade means that gays 
have nationwide political power relevant to political control 
over military policy.218 Given that the anti-gay policy at issue is 
federal, mayoral support for civil rights is immaterial. 
 
 215. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 216. Id. at 466 n.9. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 1991) (“It is beyond 
doubt that the homosexual community has been able to reach out and gain the 
attention of politicians of all sorts. One need only remember St. Patrick’s Day 
1991 in New York City to see Mayor David Dinkins marching in the tradition-
ally Irish-Catholic parade with homosexual groups and activists who were im-
portant supporters during his tough mayoral campaign.”), rev’d sub nom. 
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Other courts have followed the same approach of denying 
heightened scrutiny—based on isolated state and local exam-
ples of gay political power—and then upholding federal anti-
gay policies under rational basis review.219 Perhaps most nota-
bly, the Ninth Circuit in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial 
Security Clearance Office220 considered an equal protection chal-
lenge to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) long-maintained 
policy of requiring expanded investigations of all gay applicants 
for Secret and Top Secret clearances. This policy effectively 
precluded gay men and lesbians from working in both govern-
mental and private positions that required security clearanc-
es.221 The Ninth Circuit refused to apply heightened scrutiny 
because gay Americans “are not without political power.”222 To 
support its conclusion, the court noted that Wisconsin barred 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
that California has barred violence against persons or property 
based on sexual orientation, that Michigan has barred the de-
nial of care in health facilities on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, that New York had an executive order prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination, and that nine cities included sexual 
orientation in nondiscrimination ordinances.223 Relying on these 
atypical state-based instances of nondiscrimination, the court 
applied rational basis review and upheld the DoD’s anti-gay 
policy.224 The court never attempted to explain how gay-
inclusive laws in a few states translated into gays having polit-
ical power vis-à-vis Congress or the DoD. 
This judicial invocation of non-federal examples of gay po-
litical power in cases challenging federal laws is inappropriate 
and misleading. In a different Ninth Circuit challenge to the 
 
Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff ’d sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 219. See, e.g., id. at 8 n.15 (upholding the military’s anti-gay policy after 
denying heightened scrutiny, in part, because several cities “have passed anti-
discrimination regulations concerning homosexuals” and “California, Michi-
gan, New York and Wisconsin all have various statewide legislation or regula-
tions which benefit homosexual groups”). 
 220. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by SmithKline Beecham Corp. 
v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 221. Id. at 569 n.5. 
 222. Id. at 574. 
 223. Id. at 574 n.10. The court also asserted that, based on Bowers, “be-
cause homosexual conduct can . . . be criminalized, homosexuals cannot consti-
tute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis re-
view for equal protection purposes.” Id. at 571. 
 224. Id. at 580–81. 
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military gay-exclusion policy, the Army argued that gay people 
“cannot be politically powerless because two states, Wisconsin 
and California, have passed statutes prohibiting discrimination 
against homosexuals.”225 Although the majority avoided the 
equal protection issues by deciding the case on estoppel princi-
ples, Judge Norris, in concurrence, explained the folly of the 
Army’s position: “Two state statutes do not overcome the long 
and extensive history of laws discriminating against homosex-
uals in all fifty states. Moreover, at the national level—the rel-
evant political level for seeking protection from military dis-
crimination—homosexuals have been wholly unsuccessful in 
getting legislation passed that protects them from discrimina-
tion.”226 In other words, the courts in these cases are using the 
wrong lens; it matters little if some states provide protection to 
gay Americans when the policy being challenged is federal and 
gay Americans do not have political power at the federal level. 
Despite employing the wrong lens, cases like High Tech 
Gays have proven instrumental in upholding a litany of anti-
gay laws. Subsequent courts have relied on High Tech Gays for 
the proposition that gays have political power and, therefore, 
are not entitled to heightened scrutiny.227 More importantly, 
over a dozen judicial opinions have relied on High Tech Gays to 
deny heightened scrutiny to gay people and to uphold anti-gay 
policies to fire government attorneys,228 to terminate foreign 
service officers,229 to deny to security clearances to private em-
ployees requiring them,230 to uphold DADT,231 to uphold 
DOMA,232 to uphold sodomy laws,233 and to uphold state same-
 
 225. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 n.30 (9th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc) (Norris, J., concurring). 
 226. Id. (citation omitted). 
 227. See, e.g., Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (E.D. 
Cal. 1993). 
 228. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 1995), reh’g 
en banc granted, opinion vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), aff ’d en banc, 
114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 229. See U.S. Info. Agency v. K.R.C., Civ. A. No. 87–1740(CRR), 1991 WL 
166683, at *2 n.6 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1991), aff ’d, 989 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 230. See Dubbs v. CIA, 769 F. Supp. 1113, 1116–17 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
 231. See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 232. See Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 875, 880 (C.D. Cal. 
2005), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 233. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 353–54, 354 n.8 (Tex. App. 
2001), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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sex marriage bans234—in states never mentioned in High Tech 
Gays. None of these federal or state anti-gay laws involved laws 
from the states in which the Ninth Circuit found gays to have 
political power. And yet, these courts held that because gays 
enjoyed political power in a very few states, sexual orientation 
is not a suspect classification in any state or when challenging 
any federal law. As a result, because gay people in a handful of 
states and two handfuls of cities received some measure of pro-
tection from irrational discrimination, courts treated all gay 
people as having political power over the federal government, 
including the armed services, and in states and localities that 
are decidedly anti-gay. 
Defenders of anti-gay federal laws continue to highlight 
atypical examples of states protecting their gay citizens. Con-
gress notably employed this strategy when defending DOMA. 
After President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder de-
termined that DOMA was unconstitutional and declined to de-
fend its constitutionality, some members of the House of Repre-
sentatives created the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(BLAG) to defend DOMA in court.235 BLAG argued that gay 
Americans possess political power, that heightened scrutiny is 
therefore inapplicable, and that DOMA can survive rational 
basis review. To make its case, BLAG emphasized that a hand-
ful of state legislatures had voted to recognize same-sex mar-
riages and more states had granted same-sex couples most of 
the rights associated with marriage.236 BLAG argued that gay 
“[p]laintiffs cannot maintain that they are part of a class that 
faces ‘discrimination [that] is unlikely to be soon rectified by 
legislative means.’”237 This assertion is curious given that the 
discrimination at issue was DOMA. How exactly would mar-
riage discrimination “soon [be] rectified by legislative means” 
when the members of BLAG had committed themselves to en-
 
 234. See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1099 (D. Haw. 
2012), vacated and remanded, 585 F. App’x 413 (9th Cir. 2014); Conaway v. 
Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015). 
 235. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 236. Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor-Defendant’s Opposition 
to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 18–19, Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 
2d 394 (No. 10-CV-8435) [hereinafter BLAG Brief ]. BLAG also noted that sev-
eral states had same-sex marriage as a result of judicial rulings. This is not an 
indication of political power. 
 237. Id. at 12 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 440 (1985)). 
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suring that DOMA would be neither repealed nor invalidat-
ed?238 One federal judge noted that these arguments were un-
persuasive in light of the fact that “since 1990 anti-gay mar-
riage statutes or constitutional amendments have been passed 
by 41 states and are continuing to be proposed and passed.”239 A 
far better indicator of the relevant political power of gays was 
DOMA itself, a federal law designed to discriminate against 
gay couples and one that illustrates the political powerlessness 
of gays nationally.240 
B. STATE LAW, A DIFFERENT STATE’S LENS 
In challenges to anti-gay state laws, courts emphasize that 
other states—besides the one whose law is alleged to violate 
equal protection guarantees—have protected gay rights. For 
example, a court considering Nevada’s ban on same-sex mar-
riage held that “homosexuals have meaningful political power 
to protect their interests,” because “homosexuals recently pre-
vailed during the 2012 general elections on same-sex marriage 
ballot measures in the States of Maine, Maryland, and Wash-
ington, and they prevailed against a fourth ballot measure that 
would have prohibited same sex marriage under the Minnesota 
Constitution.”241 From these four data points, the court sweep-
 
 238. BLAG accused the DOMA challengers of being “oblivious to the irony 
of maintaining that homosexuals have limited political power” when the DOJ 
supported their position. Id. at 12–13. 
Yet BLAG was equally oblivious to the irony of arguing that gays have 
abundant political power when the congresspeople behind BLAG had a passed 
a federal law to require discrimination against gay couples, had passed special 
legislation and spent millions of dollars to defend this discriminatory law, and 
were actively arguing that same-sex couples were not entitled to equal protec-
tion under the law. That Congress had affirmatively taken all of these actions 
to hurt gay Americans is proof positive that gays lack political power at the 
federal level. 
BLAG noted that Obama had nominated a handful of openly gay judges 
(one of whom was recently confirmed), that corporate America was more sup-
portive of gay rights, and that gay candidates were winning state and local 
elections. Id. at 13–17. But BLAG did not explain how any of these translated 
into political power vis-à-vis Congress. 
 239. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331 (D. Conn. 
2012). 
 240. See Rush, supra note 45, at 722–23 (“Indeed, one logically could con-
clude that passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), defining marriage 
as between a man and a woman, and the efforts of many states to pass laws 
limiting marriage to a man and a woman, are the ultimate evidence of just 
how politically powerless gays are throughout the country,” (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 241. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1013 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d 
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ingly rejected the claim that “homosexuals do not have the abil-
ity to protect themselves from discrimination through demo-
cratic processes such that extraordinary protection from ma-
joritarian processes is appropriate.”242 The court never 
explained why these four hard-fought state victories (in gener-
ally gay-supportive states) proved that gays have political pow-
er in Nevada, let alone nationwide. 
In addition to looking in the wrong state, courts misinter-
pret the evidence that they find in other states. For example, a 
Texas appellate court upheld that state’s ban on same-sex mar-
riage under rational basis after concluding that gay people are 
not a “politically powerless minority.”243 The court’s sole support 
was the fact that forty-six percent of Colorado voters opposed 
amendment 2 and over forty-seven percent of California voters 
opposed a referendum banning same-sex marriages.244 In both 
of these non-Texas examples, voters adopted explicitly anti-gay 
laws.245 It is almost nonsensical that political losses in Colorado 
and California are evidence that gays possess political power in 
Texas. 
Courts analyzing the political power factor in cases involv-
ing challenges to anti-gay state laws have also sometimes used 
a national lens. For example, a district court in Nevada upheld 
that state’s ban on same-sex marriage under rational basis re-
view after holding that the gay plaintiffs were not entitled to 
heightened scrutiny because gays were not politically power-
less.246 After noting that President Obama had announced his 
support for marriage equality and had directed the Attorney 
General not to defend DOMA in court, the judge concluded that 
the fact “[t]hat the homosexual-rights lobby has achieved this 
indicates that the group has great political power.”247 It is inter-
 
sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 242. Id. 
 243. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 673 (Tex. App. 2010). 
 244. Id. 
 245. For more information on amendment 2, see Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 
1335 (Colo. 1994). For more information on California’s referendum, see 
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 246. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
 247. Id. While the court sees this evidence of political power, the DOJ’s de-
cision to not defend DOMA was more likely driven by its lawyers’ independent 
determination that DOMA was, in fact, unconstitutional. See Pedersen v. Of-
fice of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 330 (D. Conn. 2012) (“This Court 
agrees that BLAG’s ‘contention that a two-year-old letter from a gay rights 
advocacy group was the pivotal consideration in the Administration’s reas-
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esting that the court emphasized the current president’s oppo-
sition to DOMA while ignoring the significance of Congress en-
acting an anti-gay law specifically designed to harm gay fami-
lies.248 The court noted that Congress has refused to included 
sexual orientation “under Title VII’s protections,” but gave this 
no weight because it concluded that the political power factor 
“weighs greatly in favor of rational basis review.”249 
Some state courts hearing challenges to anti-gay state laws 
and evaluating whether gay people lack political power have, in 
fact, used the proper state lens. In these cases, different courts 
have reached different conclusions. Some state supreme courts 
have found that gay people lack political power within the state 
and are entitled to heightened scrutiny.250 In contrast, other 
state supreme courts have found that gay people possess politi-
cal power in the state.251 This demonstrates the legal signifi-
cance of regional variations in political power. 
 
sessment of the law or that it demonstrates that gay men and lesbians have 
political power is speculative at best.’” (quoting Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012))). 
 248. Furthermore, presidential preferences are an inappropriate measure 
of a group’s political power for several reasons. First, while President Obama’s 
endorsement of equality is welcomed, the views of the President are largely 
irrelevant to how the lives of gay Americans are lived and how their rights are 
denied. Second, presidential preferences do not necessarily translate into poli-
cy. Prior to President Obama, the president most supportive of gay rights was 
President Clinton, who campaigned in 1992 on his commitment to equal rights 
for gay Americans. His personal commitment to nondiscrimination did not 
prevent him from signing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the mislabeled Defense 
of Marriage Act, the two major pieces of gay-related legislation enacted during 
the Clinton era, both which codified discrimination against gay 
servicemembers and same-sex couples, respectively. Third, this measure is too 
ephemeral. Obama’s Republican challenger in 2012 was Mitt Romney, a decid-
edly anti-gay candidate. If Romney had won, would gays then be considered 
politically powerless for equal protection purposes? The determination of polit-
ical power cannot turn on quadrennial elections. 
 249. Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
 250. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 447 n.42 
(Conn. 2008) (“Although we recognize that Connecticut is a leader in terms of 
the number of openly gay and lesbian lawmakers elected to the legislature, we 
view that fact as indicative of the political weakness of gay persons nation-
wide, and not as indicative of the political strength of gay persons in this 
state.”). 
 251. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 467 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[G]ays and lesbians in this state 
currently lack the insularity, unpopularity, and consequent political vulnera-
bility upon which the notion of suspect classifications is founded.” (emphasis 
added)), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 53 (Haw. 1993) (noting, but rejecting, the lower 
court’s factual finding that “homosexuals in Hawaii have not been relegated to 
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C. THE PURPOSE OF THE POLITICAL POWER FACTOR AND WHY 
THE CORRECT LENS MATTERS 
As explained in Part II, the purpose of the political power 
factor is to determine whether the political process has failed to 
protect a minority from mistreatment. When the political pro-
cess targets a minority for discrimination, courts employ 
heightened scrutiny to ensure that the challenged law is not 
the product of prejudice.252 This seems straightforward, but the 
language of the political power factor lends itself to misinter-
pretation because it speaks in the singular of “the” political 
process as if only one political process existed. For example, the 
Supreme Court has noted the need for heightened scrutiny 
when minorities “are relatively powerless to protect their inter-
ests in the political process.”253 State courts, too, refer to “the po-
litical process” as though one political machine controlled the 
whole country. 
The American political system, however, is composed of lit-
erally thousands of political processes. Every state, county, city, 
and school board has its own political process. The federal gov-
ernment, too, has multiple political processes given that—in 
addition to Congress—the regulatory agencies and military 
branches have significant autonomy in developing policies. To 
determine whether an anti-gay law is the result of a prejudi-
cial, failed political process, one must first determine which po-
litical process is relevant. 
Courts err when they look at any political process instead 
of examining the political process that created the challenged 
law. Gays have no voice in many of the political processes in 
the United States. Indeed, many political processes are decid-
edly anti-gay. If the purpose of the political power factor is to 
determine whether a challenged law is the product of prejudice, 
then the relevant political process is the one that created the 
law. Thus, when Congress enacts anti-gay laws, such as DOMA 
 
a position of ‘political powerlessness.’ . . . [T]here is no evidence that homosex-
uals and the homosexual legislative agenda have failed to gain legislative sup-
port in Hawaii” (quoting the circuit court’s evidentiary findings)), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 
963, 974–75 (Wash. 2006) (“The enactment of provisions providing increased 
protections to gay and lesbian individuals in Washington shows that as a class 
gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, instead, exercise increasing po-
litical power.”), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 252. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text. 
 253. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) 
(emphasis added). 
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or DADT, the relevant inquiry is whether gay Americans have 
political power in Congress. Federal courts evaluating anti-gay 
federal laws should not look at state progress when determin-
ing whether or not gays are politically powerless. State-based 
analysis provides no evidence as to whether the federal political 
process has failed in a manner that warrants heightened scru-
tiny of federal laws that target gay Americans. In other words, 
did the political process that created the challenged law fail? 
Was this process tainted by prejudice? 
Similarly, state courts err when they look to out-of-state 
examples of gay political victories in order to hold that gays 
have political power more broadly. Equal protection claims 
based on state constitutions, being evaluated in state courts, 
should necessarily involve a state-centric view of the elements 
used to determine suspect classifications. When applying equal 
protection under a state constitution, the court is determining 
only whether laws targeting gays are suspect in that state. 
This, in turn, should be a function of whether gays are political-
ly powerless in that state. That gays have a modicum of politi-
cal power in Maine is irrelevant to whether sexual orientation 
is a suspect classification in Alabama. The inquiry for equal 
protection purposes should not focus on gay people in other 
states who are unaffected by the discriminatory law. Rather, 
the inquiry should ask whether those gay people targeted by 
the discriminatory law are politically powerless.  
When courts can look outside of the relevant political pro-
cess for evidence of political power, it exacerbates the problem 
of cherry-picking. Using isolated examples of local successes to 
generalize about national political power results in false ex-
trapolations.254 Yet judges and attorneys do this often when as-
serting that gay Americans possess too much political power to 
qualify for suspect classification. For example, in arguing that 
gays had political power, BLAG emphasized the fact that Cali-
fornia had enacted a law that required the state’s “public school 
textbooks to include historical contribution[s] of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgendered (‘LGBT’) Americans,” but ignored 
 
 254. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d 
623 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The Ninth Circuit’s position in High Tech Gays not only 
exaggerates the significance of recent anti-discrimination efforts, it suffers 
from a more fundamental error. It mistakenly assumes that scattered, piece-
meal successes in local legislation are proof of political power, and hence an 
invalidation of the use of heightened scrutiny in governmental classifications 
based on sexual orientation.”). 
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the fact that no other state had a similar law and many states 
had proposed or maintained laws that forbid any discussion of 
homosexuality in public schools.255 More importantly, given the 
case’s influence in denying heightened scrutiny of anti-gay 
laws,256 the High Tech Gays court picked atypical examples to 
support its sweeping assertions about the political power of gay 
Americans.257 Noting that the Ninth Circuit had cited “anti-
discrimination provisions in three states, an executive order in 
New York, and a series of local ordinances,” a federal judge in 
Kansas explained that High Tech Gays court had presented “an 
inaccurate, and exaggerated, view of recent state anti-
discrimination legislation.”258 The Kansas judge noted that the 
Ninth Circuit’s source, a special edition of the Harvard Law 
Review, “conclude[d] that discrimination against homosexuals 
is pervasive, and recent changes in the law too inadequate to 
provide adequate protection.”259 The Ninth Circuit erred by 
looking at individual victories to infer a pattern of political 
power. The court also failed to appreciate that the exception 
proves the rule: the fact that these successes stand out shows 
that they are, in fact, exceptional.260 
V.  MOVING FORWARD   
Part IV explained how, in equal protection cases challeng-
ing anti-gay laws, a disconnect exists between the source of the 
anti-gay law and where courts look for evidence to determine 
 
 255. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 330–31 (D. 
Conn. 2012). 
 256. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text. 
 257. See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 n.30 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); BLAG Brief, supra note 236, at 18–19. 
 258. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1549. 
 259. Id. at 1550. This case also illustrates how courts engaging in cherry-
picking often overemphasize examples of gay victories while simultaneously 
disregarding evidence of anti-gay prejudice animating anti-gay laws. For ex-
ample, after Colorado’s vote passed Amendment Two, a federal judge—
considering an Equal Protection challenge to the Navy’s anti-gay policy—
discounted this by asserting that “evidence that one state has enacted legisla-
tion preventing homosexuals from participating in its political process is insuf-
ficient to support the conclusion that homosexuals generally lack political 
power as a class.” Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 n.9, 
(E.D. Cal. 1993). It seems incongruent for judges to require gay plaintiffs to 
show that gays “generally” lack political power but then have judges refute 
plaintiffs’ evidence of political powerlessness with atypical examples. 
 260. See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (“Moreover, an event’s newswor-
thiness could very well indicate that the event is aberrational or exceptional as 
opposed to an ordinary or commonplace occurrence.”). 
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whether gays have political power. This leads to inaccurate as-
sessments about the political power of gay people targeted by 
anti-gay laws. This disconnect also means that gay people in 
gay-hostile states are essentially being penalized for the legis-
lative victories achieved by gays in other states. This Part con-
siders three potential judicial responses to address the geo-
graphic problems currently associated with the political power 
factor. 
First, one possible approach is for courts to make geo-
graphically tailored findings of political power such that the po-
litical power inquiry is tethered to the political unit that enact-
ed the challenged law. One could argue that the test for 
whether a minority group is politically powerless should focus 
on whether that group has political power vis-à-vis decision-
makers who have enacted the challenged law. If the political 
power factor is intended to determine whether the political pro-
cess that created the discriminatory law was a product of prej-
udice, then it makes sense to examine that political process, not 
others. Thus, in an equal protection challenge to DOMA or 
DADT, courts would examine whether gays have political pow-
er vis-à-vis Congress and the President, not whether gays have 
political power with respect to the state legislatures in Califor-
nia and Wisconsin.261 Similarly, when considering whether gays 
challenging a discriminatory state law have political power, 
courts would examine the political status of gays in that state, 
not in other states.262 
Such an approach would increase accuracy, but would cre-
ate disuniformity. Because gay people have different levels of 
political power in different states, if courts apply the political 
power factor in a state-specific manner, then sexual orientation 
could be a suspect classification in some states but not others. 
If different levels of scrutiny are applied in different states, this 
could result in similar laws being valid in some states and un-
constitutional in others. For example, Wisconsin was the first 
state to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in 
employment, housing, education, and public accommodations. 
Nevertheless, following positive votes in both houses of the 
Wisconsin legislature, in 2006 the Wisconsin electorate voted to 
amend their state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages. 
 
 261. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 n.30. 
 262. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text. 
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In Oklahoma, a relatively gay-hostile state,263 the legislature 
and voters similarly amended their state constitution in 2004. 
Suppose gay citizens of each state challenged their state’s 
same-sex marriage ban as violating the 14th Amendment. It is 
possible that because gay people in Wisconsin could be found to 
have political power while gay people in Oklahoma could be 
found not to have such power, the marriage prohibition would 
receive rational basis review in Wisconsin but be subject to 
heightened scrutiny in Oklahoma. The same law could survive 
judicial review in Wisconsin, yet be declared unconstitutional 
in Oklahoma because of the stricter scrutiny. Such lack of uni-
formity could prove unpalatable.264 
Some judges already appear unlikely to embrace geograph-
ically customized findings. For example, in a case challenging 
D.C.’s ban on same-sex marriage, Judge Ferren explicitly ob-
served that “for purposes of evaluating constitutional norms, 
the focus on political power, or powerlessness, has to be nation-
al, not local, lest constitutional rights vary from city to city.”265 
While Ferren’s observation is not precedential, most judges 
would probably find it persuasive. 
Second, if judges are reticent to increase the accuracy of 
their political power findings at the expense of uniformity, 
courts could hold that if a group is politically powerless in any 
part—or any significant part, however defined—of the country, 
then that group should be considered politically powerless for 
the purpose of the suspect classification test’s political power 
factor. This approach ensures uniformity at the expense of 
complete accuracy, but does so in a manner that favors the tar-
gets of discriminatory laws. So long as gays are politically pow-
erless in several states, gays should be considered politically 
powerless for equal protection purposes, full stop.266 Gay people 
 
 263. See, e.g., Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 
1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (striking down Oklahoma law that punished pub-
lic school teachers for publicly supporting gay rights), aff ’d, 470 U.S. 903 
(1985). 
 264. This disuniformity may be permissible for state courts applying equal 
protection analysis under their state constitutions. See supra notes 37–38 and 
accompanying text. Applying different levels of scrutiny, however, would cre-
ate serious problems if state courts were holding their state laws were violat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as state supreme 
courts often do. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking 
down California’s miscegenation law as violating the U.S. Constitution). 
 265. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 351 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, 
J., dissenting). 
 266. This approach makes sense in that race-based laws and gender-based 
  
1636 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1579 
 
currently satisfy this standard easily: most states do not in-
clude sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination laws and 
many states enact explicitly anti-gay laws.267 Furthermore, gays 
do not have power at the national level, as shown by Congress’s 
failure to protect gay Americans from discrimination and its 
frequent efforts to target gays with discriminatory laws such as 
DOMA and DADT.268 Under this approach, given that gay peo-
ple can satisfy the other factors of suspect classification and 
lack political power in many parts of the country, sexual orien-
tation would be considered a suspect classification and anti-gay 
laws would receive heightened scrutiny everywhere. 
Third, to the extent that accuracy and uniformity are in-
herently in tension, examining the geographic quandaries 
posed by the political power factor counsels courts to abandon 
the factor altogether. If using disparate levels of scrutiny across 
states is deemed impractical or unacceptable but any uniform, 
national assertions regarding political power would be inaccu-
rate, then this suggests that the political power inquiry itself is 
ill-conceived and ill-equipped to perform the task of determin-
ing which groups warrant heightened scrutiny. The political 
power factor is largely unnecessary. The key trigger for labeling 
a classification to be suspect should be that the challenged law 
is likely the product of prejudice, not sound public policy.269 This 
is established with the first two factors: that the group has his-
torically been discriminated against and that the characteristic 
is unrelated to the group members’ ability to contribute to soci-
ety.270 Once these factors are established, the political power 
 
laws receive heightened scrutiny without any individualized findings regard-
ing political power. 
 267. See supra notes 165, 167, and accompanying text. 
 268. See generally Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 151, at 963 (detailing the 
lack of comprehensive federal protection of gays and lesbians); Powers, supra 
note 100 (explaining that gays and lesbians were not proportionately repre-
sented because there were only three openly gay representatives in Congress). 
 269. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 n.14 (1982) (“Several formula-
tions might explain our treatment of certain classifications as ‘suspect.’ Some 
classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice ra-
ther than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. . . . 
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legisla-
tive goal.”). 
 270. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 426–27 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (not-
ing that these two factors are the “most meaningful”); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. 
Supp. 2d 632, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff ’d sub nom. De Leon v. Abbott, 791 
F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding compelling the argument that “the history of 
same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the historical lack of po-
litical power possessed by gays and lesbians”). But see Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. 
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inquiry provides little additional insight.271 Political powerless-
ness may correlate with prejudice but is not a prerequisite.272 
Removing any explicit inquiry into a group’s political pow-
er should not fundamentally change the underlying insights of 
Carolene Products because, in a sense, the political powerless-
ness element seems self-evident. When gay litigants are in 
court challenging a law that discriminates against gay people, 
it is necessarily true that gay citizens did not have sufficient 
political power either to stop the law from being passed or to 
ensure its imminent repeal. If gays had political power, they 
would not need to seek protection from courts against discrimi-
natory laws. Furthermore, the factors of historic discrimination 
and relevance should sufficiently establish a group’s lack of po-
litical power. If a law discriminates based on a trait irrelevant 
to ability, that suggests that improper bias or stereotyping has 
infected the political process.273 Similarly, courts should provide 
greater scrutiny to laws that discriminate against historically 
discriminated-against groups because we have reason to believe 
that the political process has failed those groups. 
 
Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (“It is undisputed that ho-
mosexuals have historically been discriminated against, but this does not nec-
essarily mean that they therefore lack political power. . . .”); see also In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.2d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (“Because sexual orientation, 
like gender, race, or religion, is a characteristic that frequently has been the 
basis for biased and improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally 
bears no relation to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society, 
it is appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with considerable 
skepticism any statute that embodies such a classification.”); Hutchinson, su-
pra note 64, at 1010 (“Echoing the analysis in Kerrigan and Varnum, Eskridge 
also asserts that history of discrimination and relevance of the stigmatized 
trait are the only essential factors in a determination to apply heightened 
scrutiny.”). 
 271. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 428 n.21 (Conn. 
2008) (“[T]he significance of the [political powerlessness] test pales in compar-
ison to the question[s] of whether . . . the characteristic bears any relationship 
to the individual’s ability to function in society, whether the group has suf-
fered a history of discrimination based on misconceptions of that factor and 
whether that factor is the product of the group’s own volition.” (quoting Equal. 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437–
38 n.17 (S.D. Ohio 1994))).  
 272. See Eskridge, supra note 73, at 20 (“Political powerlessness may cast 
light on the perseverance of prejudice and stereotyping that harm the minori-
ty, and it may be a prudential consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court’s exer-
cise of its power of judicial review when applying the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). 
 273. See Strauss, supra note 48, at 165 (“Since overt evidence of bias is dif-
ficult to ascertain, the Court uses relevance as a proxy.”). 
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Many scholars have called on courts to eliminate the politi-
cal power inquiry for various reasons.274 The inquiry is too easy 
to manipulate.275 In discussing political power, judges are some-
times results-oriented.276 Professor Evan Gerstmann has ar-
gued that “the judicial exercise of ostensibly evaluating wheth-
er such groups as the poor, the elderly, and gays and lesbians 
meet the Court’s criteria for suspect-class status is actually a 
charade.”277 Politically powerful groups receive heightened scru-
tiny, in part, because “the Burger Court’s affirmative action ju-
risprudence reflected a shift from antisubordination to 
anticlassification.”278 This suggests that the Court cares more 
about preventing invidious classifications than protecting the 
politically powerless; yet, the political power factor remains in 
place, largely to prevent the expansion of heightened scrutiny. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has not afforded heightened scrutiny 
to any new group since the 1970s.279 Given that many groups 
have suffered a history of discrimination for immutable charac-
teristics unrelated to their abilities—like sexual orientation—
the political power inquiry has served as a useful tool for deny-
ing heightened scrutiny to the victims of targeted discrimina-
tion. Professor Hutchinson notes, “Because the Court has usu-
ally invoked political process theory to deny judicial solicitude, 
some scholars have argued that the suspect class doctrine op-
 
 274. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 73, at 20 (“Consider the nature of con-
stitutional rights, the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary, and the purpose 
of the Equal Protection Clause. All point in the same direction: political power-
lessness should not be a requirement for strict scrutiny.”); see also Equal. 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at 437–38 n.17 (stating that 
whether a particular group is entitled to recognition as suspect or quasi-
suspect class “should not be controlled by . . . a group’s ability to pass or fail 
[the] . . . political power test. . . . [R]elative political power cannot even be a 
particularly weighty factor, let alone a controlling one”). 
 275. See Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 1006 (discussing how the Supreme 
Court “inconsistently applies the political powerlessness factor”). 
 276. See GERSTMANN, supra note 54, at 55 (explaining how the Justices 
wanted to avoid “creat[ing] any new suspect or quasi-suspect classes”). 
 277. Id. at 56 (“The three-tiered framework was set up to keep new groups 
out, not to let them in, and the Court has shown no inclination to add new 
suspect or quasi-suspect classes. This has created an especially difficult situa-
tion for gays and lesbians.”). 
 278. Ross, supra note 18, at 1597 (citing Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblind-
ness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality 
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1292 (2011) and Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, 
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003)). 
 279. Levy, supra note 1, at 53 (“The Court has not recognized any new sus-
pect classifications since the 1970s . . . .”). 
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erates merely as a gatekeeping mechanism, rather than as an 
honest effort to protect politically powerless classes.”280 In short, 
the political power inquiry often seems to be pretextual, an af-
terthought used to deny heightened scrutiny of anti-gay laws. 
Ultimately, eliminating the political power factor makes 
more sense than trying to address the problem of courts looking 
for political power in the wrong places. Solving the geography 
problem would not solve the problems with the political power 
inquiry more broadly, including the fact that courts cannot 
agree on what constitutes political power and often perform 
questionable analysis on the issue. For example, the district 
court in Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy upheld the 
military’s anti-gay policy under rational basis review by assert-
ing that gay people were not entitled to heightened scrutiny be-
cause “[t]he recent Congressional and executive dialogue con-
cerning homosexuals’ ability to serve in the military 
demonstrates that, despite their apparent inability to assert di-
rect control over Congress, homosexuals have a significant abil-
ity to attract Congress’s attention.”281 Congress paid attention 
to gays solely in order to discriminate against them. The court 
looked in the right place—Congress—but bungled the analysis. 
Under the Dahl court’s approach, any time that gay people are 
targeted by anti-gay laws, that law should be reviewed under 
rational basis precisely because gays attracted the attention of 
those wishing to do them harm.282 
  CONCLUSION   
The political power inquiry of equal protection analysis is 
deeply flawed. It fails to take account of regional variations in 
political power. Too often, judges cite isolated and irrelevant 
 
 280. Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 993. 
 281. 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993). 
 282. In another case challenging the military’s anti-gay policy, Steffan v. 
Cheney, the court correctly looked for evidence of political power at the con-
gressional level but incorrectly found it based on a largely irrelevant anecdote. 
The court concluded that because thirty-three members of Congress had sent a 
letter “urging the Secretary of Defense, a defendant in this case, to comply 
with certain discovery requests. . . . [T]he homosexual community have been 
able to move well and gain attention in political circles . . . [and, thus, the] 
plaintiff has not been able to show that he is a member of a suspect class.” 
Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1991), aff ’d sub nom. Steffan v. 
Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court never explained—because it 
could not—how having approximately six percent of congressional legislators 
sign a letter asking for mere cooperation with discovery requests translates 
into political power over Congress to change the military’s anti-gay policy. 
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anecdotes in order to make sweeping claims about the nation-
wide political power of gay Americans. As a result, the political-
ly powerless gay residents of Oklahoma are denied heightened 
scrutiny of anti-gay laws because legislators in California have 
seen the wisdom of gay-inclusive nondiscrimination policies. 
For courts determined to deny heightened scrutiny to gay 
Americans, the political power inquiry provides an easily ma-
nipulated element. Ultimately, this Article provides additional 
support for eliminating the political power component of the 
suspect classification test altogether. 
